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The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organi-
zation of some 250 business leaders and edu-
cators. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political. Its purpose is to propose policies that
bring about steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, in-
creased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This Committee is
directed under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objective
in character, and the approach in each instance
is to be from the standpoint of the general
welfare and not from that of any special politi-
cal or economic group.” The Committee is
aided by a Research Advisory Board of lead-
ing social scientists and by a small permanent
professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove
a policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
Except for the members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcommit-
tee, the recommendations presented herein are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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The Committee for Economic Development has
a long-standing interest in retirement and
Social Security policies. Since its founding in
1942, CED has been unique among business
organizations in developing specific proposals
for wresting with important public issues.
Social Security is one of those issues. It is a
massive public program that affects us all and
is unsustainable in its present form.
When the Trustees of CED began their study
of Social Security over a year ago, we felt it
important to reach consensus on basic goals for
the next century. We concluded that while in
need of reform, the current system has been
enormously successful in eliminating poverty
among the elderly and that the basic Social
Security safety net therefore should be retained.
We also concluded that Social Security is
facing not one, but two threats. The first is fiscal
insolvency. If no changes are made, the Social
Security system will careen toward a failure to
meet its obligations by 2029, if not much earlier.
Second is political insolvency — the serious
crisis in confidence in the system which is erod-
ing public support. Younger workers are, with
good reason, especially skeptical, believing
correctly that it will provide a very poor, even
negative, return on their contributions to the
system.
The reforms we developed were also guided
by our strong concern over the low U.S. saving
rate. Inadequate national saving jeopardizes
future economic growth and future living stan-
dards. We believe that any serious Social Secu-
rity reforms should have a positive effect on
national saving.
The actions recommended in this statement
can preserve the Social Security safety net for
future generations without an increase in the
payroll tax. Our recommendation for mandated,
Purpose of This Statement
supplemental private saving accounts for
every worker will assure more than a bare-
bones retirement benefit, with an improved
“rate of return” for younger workers. It will
also help restore public confidence in the
system and increase national saving.
But the dual goal of having a Social
Security system that is “fair” to older workers
and retirees and “there” for younger and
future workers can only be achieved at an
affordable cost if the nation acts soon. Delay
will ultimately be very, very costly to the
future workforce.
In this report, we draw on the analysis
and recommendations of many scholars and
researchers and on CED’s strong body of work
in this area. The most recent statement, Who
Will Pay For Your Retirement? The Looming
Crisis, was issued in 1995. While that state-
ment focused primarily on private pensions, it
issued an early warning on Social Security
and cautioned that “merely passing the bur-
den to future generations is both inequitable
and bad economics.”
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1Introduction
lation, substantial change in the Social Secu-
rity system is inevitable; if no action is taken,
the system will go broke. When the baby-
boom generation begins to retire, the system’s
current operating surplus will quickly vanish
and the trust fund balances will be drawn
down rapidly. When the trust funds are de-
pleted, it will be impossible to preserve the
system without a very sharp and disruptive
cut in benefits or a very large and inequitable
rise in the tax burden on future workers.
Fortunately, such an outcome is avoidable
if reforms are enacted promptly. Because
Social Security is such a politically sensitive
program, political leaders have been loath to
rectify fiscal imbalances in the past until a
crisis appeared imminent. But it is impera-
tive now that policy makers initiate reforms
long before the cupboard is bare, because
the cost of restoring fiscal balance rises sub-
stantially each year that action is postponed.
In addition, workers must be given advance
notice about any significant changes in the
system, so that they can make appropriate
adjustments in their retirement saving and
in the number of years they plan to continue
working. Consequently, we recommend that
important structural changes be enacted soon
and gradually phased in so that the nation’s
commitment to Social Security can be kept
without placing too great a burden on future
workers.
Unfortunately, the fiscal imbalance in the
Social Security program is not the only prob-
lem that must be addressed by Social Security
Since the first benefits were paid in 1940,
Social Security has greatly improved the eco-
nomic status of retired Americans. But uncon-
trollable demographic trends pose a great chal-
lenge to the future viability of this program.
In about a decade, the baby-boom generation
will begin to retire, generating such a sharp
rise in Social Security spending that the retire-
ment program will be bankrupt unless funda-
mental reforms are implemented beforehand.
The Social Security retirement program is
vital to the nation and must be reformed
promptly to place it on a sound financial foot-
ing and to preserve its benefits for future gen-
erations of retirees, including today’s young
workers who are losing confidence in the sys-
tem. The retirement program, more formally
known as the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI), is one of the most success-
ful social programs in U.S. history. Social
Security benefits have improved the economic
well-being of tens of millions of retired work-
ers and their families. For many participants,
retirement and survivors’ benefits have pro-
vided an indispensable source of income, sav-
ing their families from severe financial dis-
tress. The decline in poverty rates for the
elderly is strong evidence of the overall ben-
eficial effects of this program.
Like most Americans, we believe that the
basic objective of Social Security — to protect
the economic security of retirees — is sound
and that the nation must not falter in its com-
mitment to it. At the same time, because of the
challenge posed by the aging of the U.S. popu-
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2reform. Equally important is the fact that So-
cial Security, as currently designed, creates
serious inequities between generations. Un-
like their parents and grandparents, who ben-
efited greatly from Social Security, many of
the present generation of young workers and
most of their children will be saddled with a
payroll tax burden that will most assuredly
exceed the benefits they will receive. Not sur-
prisingly, polls indicate that young people are
losing faith in the Social Security program
because they believe that the government can-
not keep its promises to them. They correctly
perceive that the present system will remain
solvent only if benefits are cut, or taxes are
raised, and that either change will reduce the
investment return they receive from contribu-
tions to Social Security.
In this statement, CED recommends a co-
hesive package of reforms that can deal effec-
tively with both the insolvency and the
intergenerational inequity problems while pre-
serving the fundamental goals of the original
system. We believe that this can be done with-
out reducing benefits to current retirees, rais-
ing payroll tax rates, or placing an unaccept-
able burden on future generations.
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF
CED REFORMS
THE BASIC SYSTEM. The CED proposal
retains the existing government-funded So-
cial Security retirement program. However,
to make the system solvent, several necessary,
though painful, changes in the existing sys-
tem would be phased in gradually, including
the following:
• For upper- and middle-income workers
retiring after the year 2000, initial benefit
levels, which currently grow in line with
wages, would increase more slowly.
• The normal retirement age (NRA), cur-
rently 65 years, would be raised by two
months per year, beginning in 2000, until it
reaches 70 years in 2030. This change would
reduce lifetime benefits relative to current
law, which provides a smaller increase in
the NRA.
• Although CED believes that an extended
work life will be a necessity for most work-
ers in the future, we do not recommend an
increase in the early eligible retirement
age, which is currently 62 years.1 How-
ever, the actuarial discount at age 62 would
be substantially larger because of the in-
crease in the normal retirement age.
• The federal income tax would apply to all
benefits from the basic program in excess
of contributions made by the worker, with
additional revenues deposited in the
Social Security trust funds.
• A reduction in benefits for nonworking
spouses would be phased in gradually.
• Earnings tests for beneficiaries, which re-
duce incentives for older participants to
work, would be eliminated.
• Coverage would be expanded to require
participation by all future state and local
government employees. Participation in
Social Security by state and local employ-
ees currently enrolled in state or local pen-
sion plans would be optional.
The first four are high priority changes that
would ensure the system’s solvency, while
the remaining changes would improve equity
among participants as well as economic
efficiency.
 A NEW SECOND TIER. In order to re-
store confidence in the Social Security system
and to compensate for reduced growth in ben-
efits in the existing program (which is neces-
sary to restore the system’s fiscal balance),
CED proposes the creation of privately owned,
personal retirement accounts (PRAs):
1.  Several CED trustees favored an increase in the early eligible
age (EEA) as a signal to workers that, in view of ongoing
demographic changes, they should begin to plan now for an
extended work life.
3• Both employers and employees would be
required to contribute 1.5 percent of pay-
roll to privately owned and held personal
retirement accounts. (The self-employed
would contribute the entire 3 percent.)
These mandatory accounts would receive
preferential tax treatment similar to 401(k)
plans, and would be subject to appropriate
fiduciary regulations, including a require-
ment that accumulated funds be preserved
for retirement.
PRAs would be an add-on to the proposed
less generous but solvent Social Security pro-
gram and an addition to existing voluntary
tax-preferred private retirement programs.
Although PRA accounts would require some
new regulations, no new government bureau-
cracy would be created. PRAs would give
young workers an opportunity to earn higher
investment returns than are possible from the
basic system.
Thus, the CED plan would create a two-
tier system: (1) a fiscally balanced basic ben-
efit; that is, the present “defined benefit” pro-
gram with spending growth cut sufficiently to
make the system solvent; and (2) a new “de-
fined contribution” program that would in-
volve mandatory contributions to PRAs.2 If
this two-tier system is enacted promptly, the
economic safety net now provided by Social
Security can be preserved without overbur-
dening future workers. The economic well-
being of low-income retirees would be pro-
tected because most of the benefit reductions
in the current system (though not the increase
in the normal-retirement-age) would be lim-
ited to middle and upper income participants.
PRAs, which would provide an additional
source of retirement income for all retirees,
would be particularly valuable for those whose
benefits from the defined benefit system are
cut. Intergenerational equity would be
improved by increasing the importance of
benefits derived from a funded system and by
offering an opportunity for younger people to
receive adequate investment returns on their
contributions.
This CED plan provides a retirement sav-
ing program for workers not covered by a
retirement plan, including part-time and con-
tingent workers who frequently do not have
access to private retirement programs. Finally,
and importantly, the CED program would gen-
erate a substantial increase in national saving
that would help to boost long-term economic
growth and thereby make it easier for the na-
tion to support the growing elderly popula-
tion. Without such reform, the nation will con-
front the very unpleasant choice of a
substantial reduction in the economic status
of the elderly or an economically damaging
and unfair burden on future generations of
workers (see “CED Rejects Both Increased Tax
Burdens . . .,” page 4).
HOW AN AGING POPULATION
WILL AFFECT THE FISCAL
CONDITION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The aging U.S. population is an enormous
challenge to the Social Security retirement pro-
gram because of the way the system is fi-
nanced and the current benefit formula. The
Social Security system represents a compact
between generations whereby present-day
workers pay taxes to support current retirees
in return for the expectation of support from
future generations of workers. Such a pay-as-
you-go system can work when the ratio of
retirees to workers is not too high, but this
will not be the case in the future.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE. The share of
the U.S. population that is 65 years of age and
over is projected to rise very sharply, begin-
ning in little more than a decade (Figure 1,
page 6). This demographic shift reflects the
aging of the “baby-boom” generation and the
decline in labor force growth associated with
2. The term ”defined benefit” refers to plans that promise a
specific benefit, normally determined by a formula relating to
length of service and compensation. “Defined contribution”
plans promise a specific contribution to a fund.
4CED REJECTS BOTH INCREASED TAX BURDENS ON FUTURE GENERATIONS
AND THE CONVERSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY TO A PRIVATE PROGRAM BY
DIVERTING PAYROLL TAXES TO PRIVATE ACCOUNTS
CED studied and rejected proposals now
being circulated that would convert the exist-
ing Social Security system into a private retire-
ment program by directing all or a substantial
portion of payroll tax contributions to private
retirement plans. CED also opposes proposals
for raising payroll tax rates in future years as a
means of maintaining benefits and ensuring
the system’s solvency. Higher payroll tax rates
would have adverse effects on labor markets
and on the economy generally. More impor-
tant, payroll tax increases would raise the life-
time tax burden for younger workers much
more than for older workers and, thereby,
greatly exacerbate the problem of inter-
generational inequity and further erode sup-
port for Social Security by younger workers.
CED opposes the full privatization of Social
Security for two reasons. First, we believe that
a system of government-provided basic ben-
efits is needed to protect the economic security
of all participants, especially lower-income
retirees and those who experience economic
setbacks. This “safety net” aspect of Social
Security (especially the indexation of benefits
for inflation and the income-redistribution
element of the program) cannot easily be pro-
vided by the private sector.
The second reason for CED’s opposition to
proposals for converting Social Security to a
private program involves budgetary consider-
ations and costs that would be placed on fu-
ture workers. Converting Social Security from
a pay-as-you-go system to a funded system by
diverting payroll taxes to personal saving ac-
counts would impose a substantial burden on
young workers during the transition period
because they would be required to simulta-
neously fund their own retirement and pay for
the retirement of current retirees (and older
workers who would remain under the current
program) either by raising additional taxes or
by increasing the federal deficit. These addi-
tional transition costs would exist for the en-
tire period during which benefits under the
existing program continue to be paid. Of
course, the cost of PRAs, included in the CED
proposal, is also a significant burden for some
younger workers, but it does not require in-
creased deficits (or increased taxes) to keep
the current system afloat and the worker
would own all contributions to PRAs.
Most of the proposals for converting Social
Security to a private pension pay for at least a
part of the transition costs by increased fed-
eral deficits. In several proposals, a large por-
tion of payroll tax revenues would be trans-
ferred to private accounts and the benefits to
retirees in the present system would be main-
tained or reduced by much less than the rev-
enue loss. Consequently, the rise in the fed-
eral debt would be massive. (If all OASDI
taxes had been placed in private accounts in
1995, for example, the federal deficit for that
year alone would have been $359 billion
higher.) But federal deficits also place a bur-
den on future workers.(a) Increasing the fed-
eral debt might postpone costs, but it certainly
would not eliminate the burden of “privatiz-
ation.” Interest costs alone on such a debt
burden would represent a huge additional
budgetary cost that would further crowd out
productive investments. In contrast to such
proposals, the CED plan, which would make
the existing Social Security program solvent,
would substantially reduce future budget defi-
cits. CED has long favored a deficit-reduction
policy as a means of raising national saving
and encouraging longer-term economic
growth.
(a) One version of this proposal would involve the issuance
of “recognition bonds” to current participants. For reasons
explained in Chapter 3, CED believes that recognition bonds
are not an attractive option.
5the succeeding “baby-bust” generation. The
term “baby-boom generation” refers to the
exceptionally large group of people born after
World War II, from 1946 to 1964. At the end of
this period, birthrates fell sharply and have
remained relatively low (Figure 2, page 6). In
addition, with improvements in health care,
safer working conditions, and healthier
lifestyles, the average life span of Americans
is expected to continue to rise. Not only is the
number of workers surviving to retirement
age rising, but the number of years spent in
retirement is also increasing for both men and
women (Figure 3, page 6).
Recent projections made by the Social
Security Administration indicate that between
1990 and 2030, the number of people of retire-
ment age (65 and older) will more than double,
but the number of working people (age 20 to
64) will increase by only 25 percent (Figure 4,
page 7). Over the same period, the ratio of
covered workers to Social Security beneficia-
ries is expected to decline sharply from 3.4 to
1 to 2.0 to 1 (Figure 5, page 7). It is highly
unlikely that immigration or any other rea-
sonable public policy could change demo-
graphic trends sufficiently to prevent a sharp
decline in this ratio.3 Consequently, with the
current pay-as-you-go system, each Social
Security contributor must support a growing
number of retirees.
THE IMPACT ON SOCIAL SECURITY.
The Social Security program is currently ex-
periencing a substantial positive cash flow
(about $65 billion per year), but it will begin to
run operating deficits soon after the first baby
boomers begin to retire. Thereafter, payroll
taxes, at their present rates, will not be suffi-
cient to finance promised benefits. More rapid
growth in productivity and wages could only
partially offset the demographic change, be-
cause, as explained in Chapter 2, the Social
Security benefit formula is designed to make
retirees’ initial benefits (the amount they re-
ceive in the first year of retirement) grow in
line with the rise in wages. (Once benefits
begin, they are adjusted for inflation rather
than wages in subsequent years.)
Social Security’s fiscal problems are not
very far in the future: The oldest of the baby
boomers will be eligible for early retirement
benefits in 2008. Recent projections by the
Social Security Administration indicate that
with no change in policy, OASDI outlays will
exceed payroll tax revenues by the year 2010
and all tax revenues (including the taxation
of benefits) by 2012.4 (The system’s total cash
flow (including interest earnings) will turn
negative by 2019 (Figure 6, page 8), and trust
fund balances will be exhausted by 2029 (Fig-
ure 7, page 8). However, projections of posi-
tive trust fund balances by the Social Security
Administration have been revised downward
in nearly every annual reestimation, and many
believe that it is more realistic to assume that
funds will run out much sooner. Moreover,
adverse fiscal effects will be widely felt long
before funds are exhausted. The federal gov-
ernment will have to raise taxes, sell more
debt to the public, or cut spending in order to
make interest payments to Social Security and
redeem the special-issue Treasury bonds held
by the trust funds as soon as outlays exceed
tax revenues. The exhaustion of Social Secu-
rity trust fund balances is not an abstract con-
cept to young workers. Workers who will be
65 years old in 2029 are now 33 years old.
3. Substantial immigration is already incorporated into these
projections; the extremely large increase necessary to halt the
decline in the worker-retiree ratio suggests that the impact of
immigration will not be significant. For a brief analysis, see
Who Will Pay For Your Retirement? The Looming Crisis (New
York: Committee for Economic Development, 1995) pp. 25-27.
4. The reform measures proposed in this statement pertain only
to the Social Security retirement (OASI) program. (The Disabil-
ity Insurance (DI) component of Social Security is very complex
and deserving of separate study.)  References to the solvency of
the Social Security system include all of Social Security (i.e.,
OASDI), because in the past, Congress has shifted revenues
from one program to the other as needed. For
example, in 1994, additional funding for the DI trust fund was
provided by reallocating a portion of the OASI tax rate to DI.
Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 15.
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SOURCE: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital
Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office), annual, and Monthly Vital Statistics
Report.
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SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1996, p. 122.
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SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1996, p. 122.
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NOTE: The trust fund will peak in 2019 at over $2.8 trillion (current).
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, unpublished data, June 6, 1996.
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NOTE: The cost rate and income measures are presented as a percentage of total payroll subject to OASDI taxation. The total cost
rate includes benefit payments, administrative expenses, and transfers to the Railroad Retirement Fund. In 2010, the total cost is
projected to exceed payroll tax revenues. In 2019, the total cost will exceed total revenues.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, unpublished data, June 6, 1996, and Social Security Administration,
Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1996.
Figure 6
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9According to the Social Security
Administration’s intermediate projection, the
OASDI program’s annual deficit would be
more than 1.5 percent of GDP in the first year
after the trust fund runs out (2030), rising to
nearly 2.0 percent of GDP by 2070 (the last
year of available projections) if no reform is
enacted. Moreover, if the Treasury borrows
from the public to redeem the special issues
held by the trust funds (instead of raising taxes,
for example), the effect on the total federal
deficit would be substantially greater than the
increase in the Social Security deficit because
the huge increase in the Treasury debt held by
the public would cause interest costs to rise
very rapidly. To place these figures in per-
spective, spending for all of defense is cur-
rently about 3.5 percent of GDP and total fed-
eral revenues are only 19 percent of GDP.
On an actuarial basis — considering the
present value of all future OASDI income and
outlays — Social Security is currently under-
funded by about $2.5 trillion.5 If the retire-
ment system was brought into balance by
raising payroll tax rates in the future just
enough to meet projected outlays, OASDI pay-
roll tax rates would have to be raised from
12.4 percent currently to 17.1 percent by 2030,
according to the Social Security Admini-
stration’s intermediate projection.
This projected tax burden makes a compel-
ling case for major changes in the Social Secu-
rity program now. But the necessity for Social
Security reform is made even more acute when
the potential tax burden arising from other
entitlement programs for the elderly is taken
into account. Demographic changes will have
a huge impact on the growth of Medicare and
Medicaid expenditures as well as on Social
Security (which together constitute 40 percent
of federal spending). Medicare is expected to
grow more rapidly than Social Security and to
run out of funds much sooner. A rough indi-
cation of the potential burden is provided by
the Social Security Administration’s projec-
tions indicating that by the year 2030, outlays
for the OASDI system and Part A of Medicare
(Hospitalization Insurance, also financed by
payroll taxes) will equal nearly 28 percent of
taxable payroll if no reform is enacted (Figure
8). Clearly, a payroll tax burden of that magni-
tude would have serious economic conse-
quences for workers and for the economy. In
fact, recent long-range projections made by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) show
that entitlement programs for the elderly
(Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) have
put federal fiscal policy on an explosive, un-
sustainable path (see “Retiree Entitlements
Have Put Fiscal Policy on an Unsustainable
Path,” page 10).
5. Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security,
Volume 1: Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.:
January 1997), Table F1, p. 54.
Without Reform, Outlays for Social
Security and Medicare Part A Will Be
Nearly 28 Percent of Taxable Payroll
by 2030
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1996, p. 171.
Figure 8
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Social Security + Medicare Part A
Percent of Taxable Payroll
1996             2000            2005            2010            2015           2020            2025            2030
Social Security (OASDI)
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DELAYING SOCIAL SECURITY RE-
FORM WOULD BE VERY COSTLY. Politi-
cal commentators frequently suggest that the
problems of Social Security be set aside until
Congress has resolved how to manage the
more pressing Medicare and Medicaid prob-
lems. But this delay ignores the time needed
for workers to accumulate savings and adjust
their plans for retirement. Changes should be
made while the baby boomers are at work
and in their prime earning years and still have
time to make adjustments. Such a delay also
ignores the fact that the cost of restoring fis-
cal balance is rising, and that postponement
would magnify the growing inequity between
generations.
According to government projections, an
immediate 2.2 percentage point increase in
the combined payroll tax rate at the beginning
of 1996 would have restored the 75-year actu-
arial balance in the OASDI system. If no ac-
tion is taken until the trust fund runs out, the
payroll tax increase required to finance the
system on a pay-as-you-go basis would be
more than twice as large. (If, instead, a benefit
cut option were chosen to restore balance, de-
lay would similarly magnify the size and im-
pact of the cuts.) Moreover, a 2.2 percent pay-
roll tax increase would not be sufficient to
achieve a sustained fiscal balance. Because
demographic trends are not expected to change
greatly, the operating deficit will be very large
at the end of Social Security’s traditional 75-
year evaluation period, even if payroll taxes
The Social Security solvency problem is one
of the major components of the longer-range
federal budget crisis. Recent projections made
by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
show that without reform, current entitlement
programs will generate an unsustainable
increase in federal deficits and debt.(a) The
CBO report indicates that the basic problem is
the impact of population aging on the three
largest entitlement programs for the elderly:
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.
Assuming no change in policy, spending for
these three programs would rise from 9 per-
cent of GDP to 18 percent over the period
from 1995 to 2030. The interaction of rising
federal deficits and rising interest costs
required to finance the resulting debt would
generate an explosive budgetary situation
(Figures 9 and 10). This daunting prospect is
inescapable over a wide range of economic
and demographic assumptions. In a worst
(but perhaps realistic) case, the CBO projec-
tions show net interest payments rising from
about 3 percent of GDP to 31 percent, the
RETIREE ENTITLEMENTS HAVE PUT
FISCAL POLICY ON AN
UNSUSTAINABLE PATH Without Reform, Federal Budget
Deficits and Interest Costs Would
Explode . . .
Calendar Years, 1996 to 2030
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NOTE: Deficit calculated using National Income and
Products Account (NIPA) accrual basis. CBO estimates
based on discretionary spending growth set to the
projected growth rate of the economy.
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic
and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997–2006, p. 80.
Figure 9
Year
CBO projections
Percent of GDP
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Federal deficit
Net interest
payments
11
(a) Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget
Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997-2006 (Washington, D.C., May 1996).
See Chapter 4, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” pp. 69-95.
(b) The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997-2006,
p. 80.
(c) The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997-2006,
p. 69.
. . . Producing a Record Debt Burden
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NOTE: Deficit calculated using NIPA accrual basis. CBO
estimates based on discretionary spending growth set to
growth rate of the economy. Federal debt is debt held by
the public. This does not include interagency holdings
(such as the Social Security trust fund or Federal Reserve
bond assets).
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and
Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997–2006, p.80.
Figure 10
Year
CBO projections
Percent of GDP
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Federal, publicly held debt
1996 to 2030
budget deficit rising from 2 percent of GDP to
37 percent, and the federal debt held by the
public rising from 51 percent to 293 percent of
GDP — all in only 35 years (from 1995 to
2030).(b)
After examining several scenarios, the
CBO concluded that the nation’s current
budget policies are unsustainable, “even un-
der optimistic assumptions, including favor-
able demographic trends and historically high
rates of productivity growth.”(c)
Social Security and other entitlement pro-
grams for the elderly cannot continue on the
current fiscal path. Federal deficits would
crowd out private investment spending and
squeeze economic growth. At some point, the
explosion of debt would bring about a col-
lapse of output and employment in the U.S.
economy. Thus, our political leaders have no
choice but to enact reforms of Social Security
and other entitlement programs for the
elderly.
are raised immediately by an amount suffi-
cient to restore the 75-year actuarial balance.
Each year the projection is moved forward, a
deficit year would replace a surplus year, and
before long (perhaps in a decade or so), policy
makers would again be concerned about the
system’s actuarial deficit. Thus, it is important
that policy changes are sufficient to restore
the actuarial balance beyond the 75-year pro-
jection period.
ACHIEVING EQUITY AMONG
GENERATIONS
If Social Security’s only problem were that
it will be in deficit in a decade or so, the rem-
edy, though painful, would be simple: Cut
benefits and/or raise payroll taxes.  But ben-
efit cuts or tax increases lower investment re-
turns on Social Security contributions, and
these returns are already very low for younger
participants. Why will Social Security provide
lower returns to younger workers? Simply put,
in the early years, pay-as-you-go systems pay
retirees very high benefits relative to taxes
paid during the limited number of years they
contributed to the system. But as the system
matures, lifetime contributions rise relative to
benefits of eligible retirees. In the early years
the low numbers of beneficiaries relative to
the numbers of workers contributing to the
system also permitted Congress to raise ben-
efits without placing too great a tax burden on
workers. But later on, it became necessary to
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raise tax rates for each new generation of work-
ers, so that rising lifetime benefits could be
maintained. Consequently, investment returns
have declined for each new generation of
workers; most of those retiring today receive
no better than the average return on conserva-
tive investments. But for young workers and
those who have not yet entered the labor force,
the outlook is grim. Given the present struc-
ture of Social Security, most future retirees
will receive very low or even negative returns
on their contributions (Figure 11).
Reducing benefits for the 37 million Ameri-
cans, including spouses and survivors who
receive OASI benefits today, is an unattractive
option. It would place a heavy burden on mil-
lions of current retirees whose incomes are
heavily dependent on Social Security and who
no longer have the option of working. The
present Social Security retirement program is
The Return on Social Security Retirement Contributions Is Declining
and Is Already Negative for Some
Present Value of Expected Benefits Less Taxes Paid (thousands of 1993 dollars)
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(a) Average two-earner couple includes one average earner and one low-wage earner (45 percent of average).
SOURCE: C. Eugene Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to Reform
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1994.) p.287. Assumes 2 percent real interest rate.
Figure 11
Year Cohort Turns 65
1993 Dollars
1970                                         1980                                         1990                                        2000                                         2010                                        2020                                        2030
Single, average-earner male Average two-earner couple(a)
Projection based on current policy (benefit
cuts or tax increases needed to achieve
actuarial balance would worsen returns)
t
correctly credited with having contributed
to the sharp decline in poverty rates among
the elderly shown in Figure 12, page13. Social
Security accounts for more than 40 percent of
the total income of the elderly and for many, it
is their only source of income. Although CED
believes that future Social Security spending
growth must be trimmed to restore fiscal bal-
ance, we believe that cuts in benefits to cur-
rent retirees (with a consequent return to high
poverty rates among the elderly) should be
avoided.
A payroll tax increase is also objectionable.
The past practice of raising tax rates each gen-
eration on the wages of workers in order to
finance scheduled benefits has run out its
string. Raising tax rates would make the ineq-
uity between generations worse and cause po-
litical support for the system to decline fur-
ther. Moreover, as a practical matter, this
13
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Social Security Has Improved the Welfare of Retirees
Elderly Poverty Rates Haved Declined
SOURCE: Social Security Administration. Social Security Bulletin, 1995 Annual Statistical Supplement (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, August 1995), p. 163. Based on data from the Current Population Survey.
Figure 12
Year
Percent of Persons Age 65 and Older with Income Below Poverty Level, 1960 to 1995
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Percent Below Poverty Level
practice could not continue for long. The in-
centive for tax evasion would rise with each
group of new entrants into the labor force,
and if these incentives become strong enough,
the system would eventually collapse from
lack of support.
Reforms designed to improve the long-run
solvency of the Social Security program must
take into consideration (and limit) the decline
in the investment return received by young
workers. One way to mitigate the effects on
intergenerational equity is to increase reliance
on self-funded retirement programs, which is
one of the attractions of the PRAs proposed
by CED.
THE SAVING SOLUTION
As the population ages, a rising share of
the nation’s real output must be transferred
from workers who produce goods and ser-
vices to the non-working retired population.
Although this shift in resources is inevitable,
the burden on future workers can be allevi-
ated by increasing national saving and invest-
ment. Additional saving will stimulate eco-
nomic growth and increase the size of the
economic pie that must be shared. Unfortu-
nately, national saving has fallen dramatically
in the United States in recent years at the very
time when demographic conditions call for
more saving (Figure 13, page 14).
In an earlier statement, CED proposed
policy changes that would encourage in-
creased private saving for retirement in order
to reduce the burden on future workers of an
aging population and to ensure the economic
prosperity of our children.6 If it is to be effec-
tive in easing the burden on future workers,
Social Security reform must also make a con-
tribution to national saving and economic
growth. The Social Security reforms proposed
6. See Who Will Pay For Your Retirement? The Looming Crisis.
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by CED would do just that in two ways: First,
they would bring the current system into
fiscal balance by trimming the growth of ex-
penditures and thereby reduce future federal
budget deficits. Second, the CED proposal
would generate a sizable increase in private
saving. The resulting increase in national
saving (the sum of government and private
saving) would encourage productive invest-
ment and stimulate economic growth.
The CED proposal would reduce future
federal deficits substantially. Although at least
two provisions of the CED proposal (the tax
deductibility of contributions to PRAs and the
elimination of the earnings test) would have
short-term adverse effects on the federal bud-
get deficit, the overall impact of reforms pro-
posed by CED would be to reduce the deficit.
Indeed, in the long term, the restoration of
fiscal balance in Social Security would gener-
ate a major improvement in the annual fed-
eral budget balance, eventually reducing the
deficit by 2 percent of GDP annually.
Of course, restoring fiscal balance in Social
Security will not lead to higher national sav-
ing if the government spends the resulting
increase in the trust fund. Reform measures
enacted in 1983 attempted to create, tempo-
rarily, a partially funded Social Security sys-
tem in order to bring the system into long-run
actuarial balance. For more than a decade,
these reforms have enabled Social Security to
run an annual cash surplus which is invested
in special-issue Treasury bonds. The Treasury
credits interest on these bonds to the trust
funds. (These interest payments accounted for
more than half the Social Security surplus of
nearly $60 billion in 1995). On paper, the total
trust fund balances now exceed $500 billion,
which is about 1.5 times annual outlays (Fig-
14
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Low Government and Private Saving Have Lowered National Saving, 1960 to 1995
(a) Net national saving = Net private saving + net government saving. Figures expressed as a percentage of net national product.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
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ure 7, page 8).7 But most observers believe
that the current Social Security surplus does
not add to national saving and productive
resources.8 Instead, the Treasury is simply
borrowing from trust funds to spend on other
programs. Little is gained by achieving fiscal
balance in the Social Security program if the
federal deficit is not reduced dollar for dollar,
thereby increasing national saving. To be
certain that reforms generate additional sav-
ing, budgetary measures must be taken to pre-
vent government from spending the positive
cash flow in the Social Security program.9 As a
practical matter, this means that the federal
government must balance the budget without
relying on the temporary surplus in the Social
Security accounts.
The PRA accounts would also generate a
sizable increase in private (and national) sav-
ing. Of course, some individuals and busi-
nesses will finance contributions to PRAs by
reducing present contributions to private pen-
sions, 401(k)s, etc. To the extent that this form
of substitution occurs, there will be less in-
crease in private saving. Moreover, if tax-shel-
tered PRAs are substituted for saving that is
not entitled to tax preference, federal revenues
would be reduced, thereby offsetting some of
the improvement in private saving. However,
a large number of workers, including most
contingent and part-time workers, are not cur-
rently covered by discretionary employer re-
tirement plans, and many workers have little
or no personal savings to shift into the new
PRAs. For those with little or no saving, the
creation of mandatory PRAs will undoubt-
edly generate a large increase in saving. More-
over, for many, the experience of owning such
assets may encourage additional saving.
CED acknowledges that the requirement
for compulsory savings will be difficult for
workers at the lowest income levels. How-
ever, the alternatives of increased payroll tax
rates while still employed or inadequate ben-
efits while retired would be even less accept-
able.
THE CED PROPOSAL PROTECTS
BOTH CURRENT AND FUTURE
RETIREES
The CED proposal protects current retirees
and older workers while assuring the viability
of Social Security for future retirees. It breaks
with the past practice of raising tax rates to
maintain current benefits, which imposes a
larger lifetime tax burden on younger work-
ers. Instead, CED gives highest priority to
changes that would gradually slow the growth
of benefits in the basic system for new retirees
and simultaneously mandate new private,
funded retirement saving and benefits for
younger workers.
Because the annual projections of the So-
cial Security trust fund balances have been
revised downward time and again, the CED
proposal builds in a margin for projection
error. Thus, enactment of the CED reforms
could result in a substantial long-run surplus
in the retirement program. Consequently, if
experience confirms this projection, it may
eventually be possible to terminate the phase-
in of further cuts in benefits or reduce payroll
tax contributions.
The creation of PRAs will help to restore
the confidence of young people in the Social
Security system by offering an opportunity
for a higher return on contributions and giv-
ing workers a sense of ownership. Although
contributions to PRAs would be mandatory
7. Social Security tax revenues for 1996 are expected to total
about $386 billion and exceed outlays ($354 billion) by $32
billion. Earnings from trust fund investments (expected to ex-
ceed $550 billion at the end of 1996) should generate an addi-
tional $38 billion, bringing the annual surplus to about $70
billion. 1996 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
OASDI Trust Funds, 1996, p. 182.
8. To the extent that the Social Security surplus reduces the
federal deficit, it could add to national saving. But this does not
appear to be the case.
9. If the government adopted a balanced budget requirement
for the total deficit that includes Social Security, reforms that
increase the Social Security surplus could result in increased
spending (or reduced taxes) elsewhere in the budget. To pre-
vent that from happening, the total deficit target would have to
be adjusted.
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CED urges Congress and the Administra-
tion to implement reform measures without
delay that will put the existing Social Security
retirement program on sound financial foot-
ing. We also recommend that this program
retain its existing safety net and redistributive
properties whereby benefits relative to contri-
butions are higher for low-income contribu-
tors than for higher-income participants. In
addition, a new defined contribution compo-
nent of Social Security should be mandated
which, in combination with the existing sys-
tem, will ensure that all long-time participants
receive a retirement income above the pov-
erty line. The new defined contribution sys-
tem also improves intergenerational equity by
giving younger participants an opportunity
to receive better returns on contributions than
is possible with the present system.*
REFORMING THE EXISTING
SYSTEM
With respect to the existing defined benefit
program, CED recommends the following re-
forms:
• Reduce the Growth in Initial Benefits. Re-
ducing the growth in the primary insur-
ance amount (PIA), which is the first-year
benefit received by an individual who re-
tires at the normal retirement age (NRA),
is the most direct and equitable way to
trim the growth of prospective benefits
gradually and thereby reduce the system’s
costs. CED’s plan would gradually lower
replacement rates for the two higher-
income brackets, thereby reducing the
growth of future benefits from the existing
defined benefit program for middle- and
upper-income participants but not for
low-income workers.
   The growth in the PIA would also be
reduced by increasing the number of years
of income included in the calculation of
PIA from 35 to 40 years. Currently, those
who contribute for 35 years are eligible for
benefits as high as for those who contrib-
ute for a longer period.
• Reduce the Growth in Lifetime Benefits
by Raising the Normal Retirement Age.
The normal retirement age, which has re-
mained at 65 since the system was created,
has not been adjusted to compensate for
the large increase in life spans in the last
half century. This has raised the cost of
Social Security dramatically. Congress has
enacted legislation providing for a future
increase in the NRA to 67, which only par-
tially offsets the rise in average life spans.
To further compensate for past and ex-
pected increases in life expectancy, CED’s
plan would raise the normal retirement age
by two months per year beginning in 2000
until it reaches 70 years in 2030. Thereafter,
the NRA would rise in line with increases
in life expectancy.
   The early eligible age (EEA), currently
62, would not be changed. CED believes
SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
and, in many cases, would raise business costs,
these contributions should not be considered
a tax because no revenue is received by any
government agency and the funds are per-
sonally owned and privately invested.
The CED reform program would gradu-
ally phase in changes in the Social Security
system and thereby avoid serious disruptions
in labor markets and in the lives of retirees. It
would protect the economic security of lower-
income retirees and over time, further reduce
poverty among the elderly. Present retirees
and older workers would experience little or
no change in benefits from the existing sys-
tem, though the portion of benefits subject to
taxation would rise for some.
*See memorandum by JAMES Q. RIORDAN, (page 59).
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that the option of early retirement should
be preserved, especially for those in very
demanding work, though with larger actu-
arial discounts as the NRA is raised.*
• Tax Social Security Benefits. CED recom-
mends that the income tax apply to all
Social Security benefits in excess of the con-
tributions made by the worker. (Taxation
of benefits derived from a worker’s own
contributions would constitute double taxa-
tion.) With this change, Social Security
would be taxed like other contributory pro-
grams. Low-income recipients would not
be affected because they are exempted from
income taxation.
• Lower Spousal Benefits. At present, a
spouse is entitled to a retirement benefit
equal to his or her own benefit or 50 per-
cent of the worker’s benefits, whichever is
higher. Consequently, the rate of return on
contributions is much higher for couples
with a nonworking spouse than for others.
In order to reduce costs and to improve
equity between working and nonworking
spouses, CED recommends that retirement
benefits for the nonworking partner of a
retired couple be reduced gradually until
they reach 33 percent of the worker’s PIA.
CED does not recommend any reduction
in the nonworker’s survivors benefits which
may be as high as 100 percent of the work-
er's PIA.
• Eliminate Disincentives to Work. Current
law requires a reduction in Social Security
benefits for retirees whose earned income
exceeds a specified amount.10 Congress has
enacted legislation that would reduce but
not eliminate this penalty for work. The
motivations for retaining earnings limita-
tions seem to be (1) concern that there
would be a short-run budgetary cost, (2)
the presumption that the working elderly
reduce the number of jobs available for
younger workers, and (3) that Social Secu-
rity was designed to be an “income re-
placement” benefit, not a pension. But there
would be no long-run budgetary cost re-
sulting from the elimination of the earned
income limitation, and projected demo-
graphic changes now imply a shortage of
skilled labor in the future rather than a
surplus. Elimination of the earnings test
would simplify regulation and have a fa-
vorable effect on the economy. Conse-
quently, CED recommends the elimination
of all earnings tests in determining eligibil-
ity for Social Security benefits.
• Expand Coverage to Include State and
Local Employees. The Social Security sys-
tem redistributes income from high-income
retirees to low-income retirees. CED favors
continuation of a redistribution element in
the Social Security program. However, CED
believes that as a matter of equity, the bur-
den of redistribution must be widely
shared, and, therefore that coverage should
be universal. Consequently, CED recom-
mends that all new state and local employ-
ees be required to become participants in
the Social Security system and that current
employees be permitted to join Social
Security on a voluntary basis.
CED also believes that measures must be
taken to ensure that any addition to federal
cash flow resulting from Social Security re-
form be added to national saving rather than
used to finance government expenditures.
Although CED strongly endorses the goal
of achieving a balanced budget by 2002, we
regard this as only an interim goal. Ultimately,
policy makers must pursue the more difficult
task of balancing the non-Social Security or
“on budget” portion of the federal budget,
thereby ending reliance on temporary Social
Security surpluses. In this way, the Social
Security surplus would be used to retire fed-
eral debt, and raise national saving, rather
than to finance government consumption.
10. In 1996, OASI benefits for retirees under age 65 were re-
duced by $1 for every $2 of earnings above $8,280. For retirees
between 65 and 70, benefits were reduced by $2 for every $3 of
earnings above $12,500. The exempt amount for ages 65 to 70 is
scheduled to rise to $30,000 by 2002.
*See memorandum by LAWRENCE A. WEINBACH,
(page 59).
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THE SECOND TIER: PERSONAL
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
With respect to the new defined contribu-
tion program, CED believes that all employees
and employers should be required to contrib-
ute to personal retirement accounts (PRAs).
CED believes that the PRA system should be
an “add-on” to the current system. Payroll tax
revenues should not be “carved out” and con-
tributed to private accounts, because existing
payroll taxes are needed to finance benefits
under the reformed Social Security plan, which
would maintain a basic safety net. So-called
“carve out” proposals, which divert payroll
taxes to private accounts, present insurmount-
able budget deficit problems (see Chapter 3).
The PRAs favored by CED would have the
following characteristics:
• PRAs would be funded by mandatory con-
tributions totaling 3.0 percent of covered
payroll, with payments split equally be-
tween employees and employers. (The
self-employed would contribute the entire
3 percent of covered payroll.)
• PRAs would be owned by or attributed to
individuals and directed by them. Contri-
butions may be invested in a limited num-
ber of broad-based funds that invest in
private-sector financial securities.*
• Contributions to PRAs would receive
tax-preferred treatment similar to that ac-
corded to 401(k)s. Individual and corpo-
rate contributions would be made from
before-tax income, and earnings would ac-
cumulate on a tax-deferred basis. Individu-
als would pay taxes only on future benefits
derived from PRAs.
• The accumulated balances in PRAs would
be part of the estate of deceased workers in
the event of death before retirement.
CED recognizes that employers and em-
ployees currently making contributions to re-
tirement plans may redirect a portion of these
contributions to PRAs in order to comply with
the mandatory contribution requirement. To
the extent that such substitution occurs, labor
costs will be unaffected by PRA contributions
and retirement saving created by PRAs will
be partially offset.
PRAs must be privately owned. Moreover,
CED opposes proposals that the Social Secu-
rity Administration hold privately invested
PRA funds in its own name or in accounts
for individuals. Government trust accounts
involve too great a risk of political interfer-
ence with private business decisions. At the
same time, we recognize that some mandated
business participants and their employees as
well as many self-employed do not have
hands-on experience with retirement saving
accounts. Therefore, in order to protect these
groups, special rules for PRAs will be needed
to assure appropriate communications, pru-
dent investment alternatives, reasonable fees,
and preservation of funds for retirement.
• In providing appropriate safeguards for
PRAs, maximum use should be made of
existing regulations governing private pen-
sions and 401(k) and IRA saving plans (re-
vised as needed) in order to minimize the
need for new regulatory or supervisory
bodies.
• To assure that PRA accounts will be used
for their specific intended purpose — to
provide retirement income for the full re-
tirement years of the participant and spouse
— CED favors rules applicable to PRAs
that (1) prohibit withdrawals or borrow-
ing of PRA funds before retirement and
(2) ensure that funds are withdrawn gradu-
ally over the life of the participant after
retirement. (This would occur, for example,
if PRA fund balances were annuitized at
retirement.) Employers that already man-
age pension funds for their employees may
find it necessary to create separate
“side-car” accounts for PRA contributions
in order to comply with the additional re-
strictions applicable only to PRAs.
*See memorandum by JOSH S. WESTON, (page 60).
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Basic Facts About the Social
Security Retirement System
Chapter 2
The retirement component of Social Secu-
rity (OASI) is often cited as one of the most
successful social programs in the United States
because it has largely achieved its primary
goal — to ensure the economic security of the
elderly.1 The income of the elderly has grown
rapidly in the postwar period, both absolutely
and relative to the rest of the population, pri-
marily due to the expansion of Social Security
and private pension retirement benefits. In
1995, more than 37 million people, or 14 per-
cent of the population, received Social Secu-
rity retirement benefits, and Social Security
accounted for about 40 percent of the retire-
ment income of all retirees. The average
monthly Social Security payment received by
a retired worker with a nonworking spouse
was $1,030 per month in 1994. Although com-
parisons are difficult to make, it appears that
the average retiree today has about the same
total after-tax income (including non-Social
Security and nonmonetary income, such as
medicare benefits) as the average worker, in
no small part due to Social Security and other
federal social insurance programs.2
Retirees who were employed in lower-
income jobs have benefited particularly from
the Social Security retirement program because
the benefit formula is more generous for low-
income workers and they have few other
sources of income. As recently as 1970, about
one-quarter of elderly households had income
below the poverty line. In 1995, fewer than 11
percent of elderly households were below the
poverty line, slightly lower than for the popu-
lation as a whole and far below the rate for
children, who are the most disadvantaged
(bottom of Table 1, page 20).
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT
BENEFIT AND TAX FORMULAS
The Social Security retirement program is
a contributory, wage-related, defined benefit
plan financed entirely by dedicated federal
taxes. It contains elements of pension insur-
ance (largely unfunded) and welfare. An
individual’s benefits are related to past cov-
ered earnings by a complicated formula which
provides larger benefits relative to earnings
for lower-income workers. By comparison, the
revenue source is rather simple — a flat-rate
tax paid on all earned income up to a specified
limit ($62,700 in 1996). Because of the wage
1. In the United States, the term “Social Security” generally
refers to the federal retirement and disability program, more
formally known as Old Age, Survivors Insurance and Disability
Insurance (OASDI), which is the largest item in the federal
budget. As noted in Chapter 1, the policy recommendations
incorporated in this statement pertain only to the retirement
component of Social Security (OASI), which accounts for about
90 percent of Social Security’s expenditures; an analysis of the
disability program, an important and complex topic on its own,
is beyond the scope of this statement. However, because pay-
roll tax rates are sometimes reallocated among these programs,
discussions involving the financial status of the system often
combine the OASI and DI trust funds.
2. For a brief review of studies on the economic status of the
elderly, see Who Will Pay For Your Retirement? The Looming
Crisis (1995), p. 34.
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Benefit Payments (all retirees) Monthly Cash Payment
Average first-year benefits, 1994, retired workers $747
Average benefits, all retirees, by category, 1994
Individual worker 671
– without reduction for early retirement 782
– with reduction for early retirement 630
Couple, one earner 1030
Spouse 359
Survivor (widow/widower) 649
Maximum monthly benefit in 1996 at NRA, individual 1,248
Couple 1,872
Minimum initial benefit in 1994 at NRA
Individual with 30 years of contributions 519
Couple with 30 years of contributions 780
January 1996 cost-of-living adjustment 2.6%
Beneficiaries (December 1995) Number of persons
OASI 37.5 million
DI 5.9 million
Total 43.4 million
Payroll Taxes (percent) Individual Employer Total
Rates
OASDI 6.20% 6.20% 12.40%
OASI 5.26 5.26 10.52
DI 0.94 0.94 1.88
Medicare (HI) 1.45 1.45 2.90
Total 7.65 7.65 15.30
Maximum taxable earnings, 1996 (HI exempt) $62,700
Budget, Fiscal 1995 (billions) OASI OASDI
Total revenues $326 $396
Total outlays 294 335
Fiscal 1995 surplus 32 60
Trust fund assets, December 1995 448 483
Retirement age in 1996
Normal 65 years
Early 62 years
Benefit at age 62, as percent of normal benefit 80%
Percent of beneficiaries with reduction for early retirement (Jan. 95) 69.6
SSI and poverty rates
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)  (1995)
Average SSI payment to elderly $250
Maximum SSI payment to aged individual 458
Maximum SSI payment to aged couple 687
Number of elderly receiving SSI 1.5 million
Percent of aged OASI recipients receiving SSI 2.1%
Poverty income levels, 1994 (monthly income)
Individuals, aged 65 or over $592
Couples, aged 65 and over $747
Poverty rates, U.S. (1993)
Total population 15%
Individuals under 18 years old 23
All elderly (65 and over) 12
Over 75 15
Table 1
Social Security Fact Sheet
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base limit, the payroll tax is regressive with
respect to income above this limit, but the
progressivity of the benefit formula tends to
counter this effect. Some basic figures about
current Social Security benefit levels, tax rates,
and participation are shown in Table 1.
BENEFIT FORMULA. The following is a
simplified description of how initial retire-
ment benefits (the payment received during
the first year of retirement) are determined by
the Social Security Administration. (An illus-
trative calculation of workers’ retirement ben-
efits is provided on page 22.) First, the worker’s
past covered wages are inflated by an index of
historical wage growth in order to determine
the present value of past earnings. From this,
the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME)
are determined for the 35 years of highest
covered earnings. Second, a benefit rate
formula is applied to the AIME to determine
the primary insurance amount (PIA), the
monthly benefit received by a worker retiring
at age 65. The benefit formula has a progres-
sive three-bracket rate structure. In 1995, the
replacement rates were 90 percent, 32 percent,
and 15 percent, applied to the following AIME
brackets, respectively: $0 to $426; $426 to
$2,567; and above $2,567 (Figure 14, page 23).
The dollar amounts of monthly income that
define each bracket (these thresholds are
known as “bend points”) are adjusted annu-
ally to reflect increases in wages, as measured
by an average wage index.
By relating benefits to past covered wages
rather than to past contributions, the current
benefit formula, which has been in effect since
1977, has two important effects. First, increases
in payroll tax rates do not directly affect ben-
efits, but do reduce the investment return on
contributions. Second, initial benefits tend to
rise in real terms because wage growth gener-
ally exceeds inflation. Indeed, as shown in
Figure 15, page 23, average first-year benefits
have risen rapidly in real terms and they are
projected to rise further, given present benefit
formulas.
Once OASDI benefit payments begin, they
are increased automatically each year to
reflect the rise in inflation as measured by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). In January
1996, for example, benefits were boosted 2.6
percent.
ADJUSTMENT FOR EARLY OR LATE
RETIREMENT. Initial benefits are lowered
for workers who retire before age 65, the cur-
rent normal retirement age (NRA), and raised
for those who delay retirement. The adjust-
ment is intended to hold total lifetime benefits
constant for workers retiring before, at, or
after the normal retirement age. The earliest
eligible age (EEA) at which a worker may
receive Social Security benefits is 62 years.
Workers retiring at that age receive 80 percent
of the amount they would receive if they
began collecting Social Security at age 65. For
each year after 65 that a worker postpones
retirement, initial benefits are raised by 4.5
percent, but they will soon be increased to
more accurately reflect actuarial expectations.3
ADJUSTMENT FOR WORK. Under
present law, the benefits of retirees under 70
years of age are reduced if they have earned
income above a specified threshold. Specifi-
cally, in 1996, the benefits of retirees under 65
were reduced by $1 for every $2 of earnings
above $8,280; for retirees between the ages of
65 and 70, benefits were reduced by $1 for
every $3 of earnings above $12,500.4  There is
no benefit reduction for those age 70 and over.
The earnings test, which discourages labor
force participation of older workers, was en-
acted at a time when it was feared that there
were not enough jobs for all who wanted to
work. While the analytical basis of this
3. The adjustment for late retirement will be raised gradually
by 0.5 percent every other year until it reaches 8 percent for
those reaching 65 in 2008. 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social
Security Technical Panel on Trade and Issues in Retirement Saving
(September 1995), p. 9.
4. The exempt amount for workers age 65 to 70 will be in-
creased to $30,000 by 2002.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATION OF WORKER’S SOCIAL SECURITY
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
(for workers earning one-fourth, one-half and full maximum covered wage over 35 years)
                                                                      A. Earnings History
Maximum Maximum Maximum
Covered Indexed Covered Covered Indexed Covered Indexed
Year Wage Earningsa Year Wage Earningsa Year Wage Earningsa
1961 $4,800 $27,170 1973 $10,800 $32,959 1985 $39,600 $54,454
1962 4,800 25,874 1974 13,200 38,023 1986 42,000 56,089
1963 4,800 25,255 1975 14,100 37,791 1987 43,800 54,987
1964 4,800 24,263 1976 15,300 38,360 1988 45,000 53,841
1965 4,800 23,834 1977 16,500 39,030 1989 48,000 55,243
1966 6,600 30,916 1978 17,700 38,788 1990 51,300 56,435
1967 6,600 29,285 1979 22,900 46,147 1991 53,400 56,634
1968 7,800 32,384 1980 25,900 47,879 1992 55,500 55,977
1969 7,800 30,615 1981 29,700 49,883 1993 57,600 57,600
1970 7,800 29,167 1982 32,400 51,578 1994 60,600 60,600
1971 7,800 27,772 1983 35,700 54,191 1995 61,200 61,200
1972 9,000 29,184 1984 37,800 54,193    Total of Indexed Earnings   $1,487,602
                                                                                                       1/2 total maximum earnings      $743,801
                                                                                                                                          1/4 total maximum earnings      $371,901
                                                                             B. Calculation of Benefits
1995 AIME Calculation Worker with Worker with Worker with
Maximum wages 1/2 Maximum 1/4 Maximum
(1) Total indexed earnings (highest 35 years) $1,487,602 $743,801 $371,901
(2) Number of months (35 years) 420 420 420
(1)/(2)=AIME $3,542 $1,771 $885
1995 PIA Calculation
Formula
90% of AIME below $426 $383 $383 $383
+ 32% of AIME between $426 and $2,567 685 430 147
+ 15% of AIME above $2,567 146 0 0
= Initial monthly benefit (PIA) $1,215 $814 $530
Replacement ratios (PIA as percent of last year’s average earnings)
Worker 24% 32% 42%
Worker with nonworking spouse 36% 48% 62%
Annual benefit
Individual $14,580 $9,768 $6,360
Couple with nonworking spouse (150% of PIA) $21,870 $14,652 $9,540
NOTE: As these calculations show, benefits are directly related to covered wages, not to contributions. Total lifetime contributions
are affected by the distribution of wages over the individual’s working years (and the years worked) and the payroll tax rates in
effect during those years. Spouses with no earnings history receive a benefit equal to half of the worker’s PIA.
(a) Indexed earnings are wages adjusted by the average wage index except in the last three years of earnings, which use current dollars.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, with calculations by the Committee for Economic Development.
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assumption was questionable then, it is clear
that its economic impact is now undesirable,
given the expected shortage of skilled labor.
Moreover, the long-run budgetary cost of
eliminating the earnings test is minimal.
SPOUSAL BENEFITS. Spouses of work-
ers who have reached 65 years of age and
have no earnings record of their own are
entitled to receive a benefit equal to 50 percent
of the retired worker’s initial benefit. Conse-
quently, the combined benefit of a married
worker and nonworking spouse is 150 per-
cent of the benefit received by a single worker
with the same wage and contribution history.
Spouses who are eligible for benefits based on
their own work record are awarded the higher
of their own benefits or spousal benefits.
SURVIVORS’ BENEFITS.  Survivors’ ben-
efits are an important component of the Social
Security system and are frequently ignored
in discussions of the value of Social Security
benefits. About 5.2 million widow(er)s and
1.9 million children received survivors’
benefits in 1995. The widow(er) who starts
benefits at age 65 receives an amount equal to
100 percent of the worker’s benefit (PIA). Sur-
vivors’ benefits are reduced if taken before
age 65; a surviving spouse is eligible to
receive benefits at age 60 (or earlier if caring
for a child eligible for benefits), but benefits
would be reduced by about 30 percent.5
PAYROLL TAX RATES. The combined
payroll tax rate for the retirement program
(OASI) is currently 10.52 percent, with 5.26
percent levied on both employers and
employees. The combined retirement and dis-
ability tax rate (OASDI) is currently 12.4 per-
cent of covered earnings, with the employer
and employee each paying 6.2 percent. The
self-employed pay the full 12.4 percent for
OASDI. The maximum taxable wage base
($62,700 in 1996) is adjusted automatically each
year to reflect increases in the average wage
index.
THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
In 1935, when the Social Security program
was enacted by Congress at the initiative of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, it was
designed to provide only retirement benefits.
It was officially titled and promoted as an
“insurance” program. Payroll taxes were (and
still are) described as “contributions.” Because
eligibility for benefits depended simply on
participation and age, the “welfare” label was
avoided. Also critical to the acceptance and
popularity of the system in the early years
was the pay-as-you-go funding and the high
ratio of workers to retirees that made it pos-
sible to make payments to retirees almost im-
mediately and to keep payroll taxes low (see
Table 2, page 25).
SCRAPPING THE INSURANCE CON-
CEPT AND FUNDING. If the major objective
of Social Security was merely to insure people
against long life, why did the founders of the
system believe that government involvement
was needed? Private insurance could have
been developed to provide income during
retirement.6 Undoubtedly, paternalism was
involved; some supporters wanted a manda-
tory system, believing that many people would
fail to provide adequately for themselves and
for their survivors and would become a bur-
den on society in their old age. But perhaps
the best answer is that retirement insurance
was not the only objective of Social Security.
A major goal of the program that could not be
served easily by private insurance was to
redistribute benefits to favor the poor. By con-
trast, the amount that individuals receive from
5. Children (ages 18 and under) of deceased participants may
receive survivors’ benefits up to 75 percent of the worker’s PIA.
Total family survivors’ benefits are limited by a maximum
benefit formula.
6. Although private insurance companies did not provide re-
tirement insurance prior to 1935, private annuities are now
widely available.
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a private annuity is, on average, what they
put in plus the accumulated interest.7 Social
Security retirement benefits have also been
indexed to inflation since 1975, a feature that
cannot be easily replicated by private insur-
ance.8
Reforms passed in 1939 put Social Security
on a pay-as-you-go basis, thereby permitting
benefits to current retirees to be paid by taxes
on current workers, rather than by drawing
down assets accumulated in a fund. Pay-as-
you-go financing also made it possible for early
participants to receive benefits that were many
times larger than could have been achieved
from their limited contributions, and the high
ratio of workers to retirees made it possible to
raise benefits without large increases in taxes
to fund them. But it is now clear that pay-as-
you-go financing also made the system vul-
nerable to demographic change.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF BEN-
EFITS. The original Social Security Act pro-
vided cash payments only for qualified re-
tired industry workers age 65 or over.9
Coverage has since been expanded to include
virtually all workers, and new categories of
benefits have been introduced. The legislation
passed in 1939 also changed the character of
Social Security by introducing benefits for the
spouses and surviving widows of the insured
as well as for other dependents (children un-
der 18 and parents). The introduction in 1954
of disability insurance also greatly widened
the scope of benefits. Over the years, numer-
ous other legislative changes have liberalized
benefits. Of course, other government pro-
grams that benefit the elderly, such as Medi-
care, also have been enacted since the intro-
duction of Social Security.10
SPENDING GROWTH AND TRUST
FUND BALANCES
In the first decades of the Social Security
program, total revenues greatly exceeded to-
tal outlays and the trust fund accumulated
substantial reserves. But as the program ma-
tured, the total cost of Social Security benefits
Table 2
Social Security Payroll Tax
Contribution Rates
Maximum
Calendar Taxable
Year Income OASDI OASI DI
1940 $3,000 1.00 1.00 —
1945 3,000 1.00 1.00 —
1950 3,000 1.50 1.50 —
1955 4,200 2.00 2.00 —
1960 4,800 3.00 2.75 0.25
1965 4,800 3.63 3.75 0.25
1970 7,800 4.20 3.65 0.55
1975 14,100 4.95 4.38 0.58
1980 25,900 5.80 4.52 0.56
1985 39,600 5.70 5.20 0.50
1990 51,300 6.20 5.60 0.60
1995 61,200 6.20 5.26 0.94
1996 62,700b 6.20 5.26 0.94
(a) Rates apply to both employer and employee.
(b) Indexed to the rate of growth in average wages.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1995, p. 35.
7. Some have argued that one reason for government involve-
ment is that the administrative costs per dollar of benefits are
higher for private insurance than for collective insurance.
8. Private annuities can be designed to provide growth in
benefits at a specified rate, not directly linked to inflation.
Benefits can be linked to the stock market, but there have been
sustained periods when the stock market failed to keep pace
with inflation.
9. The first beneficiaries received lump-sum payments. Monthly
benefit payments began in January 1940. Social Security Ad-
ministration, Social Security — A Brief History, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, (1995).
10. Medicare, the health program for the elderly enacted in
1965, is also partly financed by payroll taxes. Spending for
Medicare is growing more rapidly than Social Security, due
largely to the combined effects of rising medical costs and the
demographic trends that will also affect Social Security. Medi-
care is facing insolvency in the near future if it is not reformed.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a welfare program for the
disabled and others, which is administered by the Social Secu-
rity Administration, also provides benefits for the aged who
have little or no retirement income. SSI is financed separately
out of general revenues.
Contribution Ratesa (percent)
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increased rapidly, placing substantial strain
on the system. First, the share of workers eli-
gible for benefits rose sharply (Figure 16). Sec-
ond, the average life span increased, so that
the proportion of workers and their spouses
who lived long enough to enjoy retirement
benefits rose (Figure 17), as did the average
number of years spent in retirement (Figure
18). Third, legislated benefit increases and the
broadening scope of benefits also contributed
to the growth of spending. Some benefit in-
creases were ostensibly intended to compen-
sate for the impact of inflation on living stan-
dards, but because of political pressures,
so-called inflation adjustments often exceeded
the rise in prices. Thus, the increase in total
spending reflected a rise in the number of
people receiving benefits as well as an in-
crease in the size of benefits. The number
receiving OASI benefits rose from 1.3 million
in 1945 to 27.5 million in 1975, while the work
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force rose only 116 percent. At the same time,
average benefits rose more rapidly than wages.
For example, real lifetime benefits for a worker
retiring at age 65 in 1980 were nearly 200 per-
cent higher than benefits received only two
decades earlier while wages were up 112 per-
cent over the same period (Figure 19).
Congress did enact some measures in-
tended to slow the growth in total spending
— such as the adoption of automatic annual
cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) beginning
in 1975, which tied the adjustment to the rise
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). But these
efforts were only marginally successful.
Throughout this period, OASDI spending rose
relative to GDP, even though its share of total
government spending temporarily stopped ris-
ing in the 1960s when defense and Medicare
growth accelerated (Figure 20, page 28).
Initially, Social Security benefits were fi-
nanced with a payroll tax of only one percent
of the first $3,000 of wages earned, levied on
both employers and employees. But as Social
Security benefits rose and the ratio of covered
workers to beneficiaries declined, Congress
found it necessary to raise taxes sharply to
keep pace with total expenditures. From 1945
to 1980, the wage base was raised periodically
and the tax rate was quadrupled (Table 2).
Despite these changes, the fiscal status of
Social Security continued to deteriorate. After
a decade of deficits, it became evident that
significant changes would be necessary to keep
the system afloat. Consequently, in 1981, a
bipartisan commission chaired by Alan
Greenspan was appointed to recommend a
program to deal with Social Security’s fiscal
crisis.
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SOURCE: Eugene Steuerle and Jon Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century, The Urban Institute, 1994.
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THE 1983 REFORMS
Under the political cover provided by the
National Commission on Social Security
Reform, Congress enacted changes in 1983 that
not only dealt with the immediate fiscal crisis
but also attempted to address an emerging
longer-run insolvency problem. Prior to the
1983 reform, actuarial projections indicated
that payroll tax revenues would fall short of
outlays when the baby-boom generation
retired. A basic recommendation of the Com-
mission, which was enacted into law, involved
the adoption of a partially funded system on a
temporary basis. The idea was to increase trust
fund balances sufficiently to ensure that the
baby boomers’ retirement could be financed
without placing an unwarranted burden on
future workers. To achieve this objective, Con-
gress legislated restraints on the growth of
spending as well as tax increases. One impor-
tant change was a gradual increase in the nor-
mal retirement age (NRA) by two years,
beginning in the year 2000, designed to par-
tially offset the projected increase in the aver-
age life span. (Life expectancy has risen by 13
years since the inception of Social Security;
life expectancy at age 65 has risen 4.6 years
since 1940 and is now projected to rise by
about three years over the next 75 years.)
CURRENT PROJECTIONS OF
INSOLVENCY
The reforms of 1983 did succeed in tempo-
rarily creating a substantial positive cash flow
in the OASDI program. The operating surplus
in fiscal 1995, for example, was nearly $65
billion. The trust fund balance at the close of
fiscal 1995 ($483 billion) was nearly1.5 times
Social Security Outlays, 1950 to 1995
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, Economic and Budget Outlook, January 1995, Office of Management and Budget, National
Income and Product Accounts, and the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, 1996 Economic Report of the President.
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annual outlays and rising rapidly. But the 1983
reforms failed to ensure the solvency of the
Social Security system for generations to come
as expected. The Social Security Administra-
tion’s intermediate or “most likely” projection
made in 1983 indicated that with policies then
put in place, the OASDI trust fund balance
would rise rapidly, reaching a peak of nearly
$21 trillion by 2045, and maintain a positive
balance at least until 2063.11 As it turned out,
actuarial projections of OASDI trust fund bal-
ances have deteriorated sharply since 1983
(Figure 21), and now the Social Security Ad-
ministration projects that the accumulating
reserve will be large enough to finance only a
fraction of the projected bulge in outlays.
System outflows are now projected to exceed
payroll tax revenues beginning in 2010. The
trust fund balances are expected to peak at
less than $3 trillion and to be completely
exhausted in 2029, 34 years earlier than envi-
sioned in 1983.12
11. Harry C. Ballantyne ASA (Chief Actuary),U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration,
“Long-Range Projections of Social Security Trust Fund Opera-
tions in Dollars,” Social Security Bulletin no. 117 (October 1983):
1-4.
12. 1995 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp.
26 and 172. The reasons for the deterioration in projections are
complex. Economic assumptions and projection methodologies
have changed significantly. Moreover, by convention, the actu-
arial projections are for 75 years and the demographic situation
is not expected to improve at the end of that period. Thus,
every year that passes, a surplus year is dropped and replaced
by a deficit year in the projection.
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Social Security Trust Fund Projections Have Plummeted Since the 1983 Reforms
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Reports of the Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1983, 1989, 1996.
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Another way to look at the financial status
of the OASDI program is to compare the
present value of benefits expected to accrue to
all participants (over a 75 year period) with
the present value of assets and future rev-
enues. By this measure, the actuarial deficiency
in the Social Security program is about $2.5
trillion.13
The most important factors underlying the
projected insolvency of Social Security are the
retirement of the baby boomers, slow growth
in the labor force, and rising life expectancy
(see Chapter 1). The oldest baby boomers are
now 51 years old and will begin to retire in a
little more than a decade. The Social Security
Administration’s best estimate is that the pro-
portion of the population 65 or older will jump
from about 13 percent in 2010 to nearly 20
percent in 2030 (Figure 22), largely due to the
retirement of the baby boomers. The ratio of
workers to beneficiaries is expected to decline
from 3.4 to 1 in 1990 to 2.0 to 1 in 2030.
The massive revisions in past projections
of Social Security funding highlight the uncer-
tainty in demographic and economic condi-
tions and their impact on both revenues and
outlays. Because the annual revisions have
repeatedly made projections more pessimis-
tic, many have concluded that the Social Secu-
rity Administration’s high-cost alternative pro-
jection, in which trust fund balances are
depleted much sooner, is more realistic.
It seems likely that, as the retirement of the
baby boomers approaches (the oldest will be
13. Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security,
Volume 1: Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.:
January 1997), p. 54.
Persons Age 65 and Older as a Percentage of Total U.S. Population, 1950 to 2070
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1995, p. 147.
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eligible for early retirement in 2008), new
information will be acquired that should
improve the reliability of the Social Security
Administration’s projections. But CED
believes that policy makers must proceed
now on the basis of the available best-esti-
mate projection that shows a huge funding
deficiency early in the next century if cur-
rent policies are not changed. Moreover, as a
means of dealing with uncertainty in projec-
tions, CED also favors policy changes that
provide a margin for error and are designed
to compensate automatically for shifting eco-
nomic and demographic variables. For
example, increases in the normal retirement
age could be indexed to changes in life expect-
ancy.
SOCIAL SECURITY, BUDGET
DEFICITS, AND SAVING
To lighten the burden on future workers,
who will have to produce all of the goods and
services consumed by retirees, the growing
trust fund balances need to add to national
saving and investment and thereby raise pro-
ductivity and the size of the economic pie that
must be shared with growing numbers of re-
tirees. But balances that are accumulating in
the trust funds do not add dollar for dollar to
the nation’s saving and productive wealth. By
law the Social Security trust fund reserves
must be invested in special U.S. Treasury se-
curities; the Treasury, in turn, may use these
funds to finance government expenditures.
Thus, in contrast to private securities that gen-
erally finance productive investments, Trea-
sury securities held by the Social Security Ad-
ministration may finance government’s
consumption. Of course, a positive cash flow
in Social Security would increase national sav-
ing14 if, instead of being used to finance gov-
ernment spending, it actually generated a lower
total budget deficit. If Social Security surpluses
lowered budget deficits, private funds would
be released from federal government securi-
ties and invested elsewhere, where they could
add to the stock of productive capital (see box,
page 32). But many experts believe that the
trust funds are merely an accounting device
used to mask the true size of the budget defi-
cit and provide little or no real saving for the
economy (see Figure 23, page 32).
Given the aging of the U.S. population, it is
imperative that the Social Security operating
surplus is used to reduce the federal deficit
and, thereby, add to national saving. How-
ever, one possible difficulty with a goal of
balancing the total budget is that, if the target
is achieved, additional cuts in Social Security
could lead to increased expenditures in an-
other program or federal tax cuts and no fur-
ther improvement in national saving. CED
strongly endorses the goal of achieving a
balanced total federal budget by the year
2002, but we believe that this should be
viewed as an interim target. We encourage
political leaders to look ahead to a more dif-
ficult task of balancing the “on budget” por-
tion of the federal budget, which does not
include Social Security. Under such circum-
stances, the Social Security surplus would be
used to buy down the outstanding debt of the
Treasury and, thereby, raise national saving.
Another reason for concern about the ef-
fects of the OASI program on saving is the
apparent adverse effects of social insurance
programs on private saving. If people are en-
titled to retirement benefits (and health care)
in their old age, will this affect the level of
private saving? The answer is complicated.
There are some individuals who probably
would not be able to retire without social
insurance; given the opportunity for retire-
ment (or earlier retirement) provided by fed-
eral health and pension programs, they may
actually save more while working in order to
improve their comfort in retirement. The ma-
jority of workers, however, probably view so-
cial insurance as added security that encour-
ages earlier retirement and/or reduces the
14. National saving is the sum of individual, corporate, and
government saving or dissaving.
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Federal Budget Deficit and the Social Security Surplus, 1970 to 1995
SOURCE: Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997-2000
Washington, D.C.: (U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1996).
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The impact of the operating surplus in
Social Security on saving is problematic
because we do not know the answer to the
counterfactual question: Would Congress
spend less if Social Security was not running a
surplus?a Although Social Security is officially
“off budget,” the Social Security surplus con-
tinues to be relied upon to finance the pro-
jected deficit in all Congressional and Admin-
istration proposals to reduce the federal deficit
as well as in proposals for a constitutional
amendment to balance the budget. Congres-
sional plans for a balanced budget in 2002 do
not come close to balancing the budget without
the help of the rising Social Security surplus;
in that year, federal spending would have to
be cut by an additional $112 billion, or about
1 percent of GDP, to balance the budget ex-
cluding Social Security.
a Congressional budget rules applicable to Social Security
and other entitlements (known as PAYGO) were intended to
prevent changes in the Social Security surplus from being
used to finance non-Social Security spending. But Congress
can and does change such arrangements. This was true when
Gramm-Rudman rules were in effect and also more recently.
In 1993, for example, Congress dedicated a portion of taxes
paid on Social Security benefits to Medicare and, in the
following year, lowered the OASI payroll tax rate and raised
the DI rate without affecting the total.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE CURRENT BUDGET DEFICITS
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necessity of saving for retirement. Indeed,
while the precise magnitude of Social
Security’s impact on private saving is contro-
versial, in all likelihood it is a significant dis-
incentive for workers to save.
Thus, while Social Security undoubtedly
lifts the economic well-being of millions of
retirees, it may have substantial long-run
adverse effects on productivity and economic
growth because of its effects on both public
and private saving. Future reforms in the sys-
tem should consider ways to make Social
Security a positive factor in the drive to
increase national saving. (Reforms will be
discussed in Chapter 3.)
REPLACEMENT RATIOS AND
BENEFIT-CONTRIBUTION RATIOS
The benefit formulas described in this chap-
ter indicate that Social Security retirement
benefits are related directly to past covered
wages, not to past contributions. The result is
that if benefit formulas are not changed, “re-
placement ratios” (the ratio of initial benefits
to final wages before retirement) are expected
to remain in a fairly narrow range. As shown
in Figure 24, the initial Social Security retire-
ment benefit received by the average worker
now replaces about 43 percent of a worker’s
final wages. Replacement rates are higher
for low-income workers than for high-income
workers and are also affected by marital
status.15
Replacement Ratios Have Leveled Off
SOURCE: Steuerle and Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century, p. 97.
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15. In 1995, Social Security replaced about 58 percent of the
wages of low-income workers, and 23 percent of covered wages
of high-income workers; the average replacement ratios were
45.6 percent for two-earner couples, 61.7 percent for one-earner
couples and 41.1 percent for single retirees. 1995 Annual Report
of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insur-
ance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) p. 185.
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Historical data on replacement ratios over
time suggest that new retirees today are about
as well off relative to their last year of earnings as
others who retired during the last decade or
so. But this does not mean that recent retirees
have received as “good a deal” as earlier retir-
ees. Although recent retirees live longer and
receive higher lifetime benefits, they have also
contributed longer and have paid higher tax
rates. Consequently, those retiring now re-
ceive less benefit per dollar contributed than
those who are already receiving benefits. As
shown in Figure 25, the internal rate of return
on OASI taxes paid has declined sharply and
will continue to decline for many years, even
with no change in benefits and tax rates.16
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Social Security Rates of Return Will Continue to Fall, 1975 to 2030
(OASI)
(a) Average two-earner couple has one earner with an average income history and one with a low income history (45 percent of
average income).
NOTE: Internal rate of return is the interest rate on contributions that would purchase an annuity equal to projected benefits.
SOURCE: Steuerle and Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century, p. 290.
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Unfortunately, most reform measures that
would improve the fiscal balance of the OASDI
program, whether reduced benefits or
increased payroll taxes, would necessarily
reduce the return on contributions further. In
Chapter 3, CED proposes reform measures
that would simultaneously eliminate the
Social Security system’s actuarial deficit, while
raising returns on contributions for future
workers.
16. Several measures are used to calculate the return on contri-
butions. While they differ somewhat in concept and measured
changes, they all show the same general trend of declining
returns.
19
35
2029
2028
2027
2026
2025
2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
A Program for Reforming
Social Security
Chapter 3
The description of Social Security provided
in Chapters 1 and 2 pointed out two major
problems of the retirement program (OASI):
The system is projected to become insolvent,
and returns on contributions are falling. The
analysis also pointed out that the significance
of Social Security’s long-term fiscal problem is
magnified when considered in the broader
context of the decline in national saving, the
even larger fiscal problems in the Medicare
program, the growth of Medicaid, and insuffi-
cient coverage and saving in private retire-
ment programs. As public understanding of
these issues grows, confidence in the ability of
the Social Security system to protect the eco-
nomic security of future retirees is eroding.
Political leaders are reluctant to deal with
the Social Security retirement program, in part
because the system is currently running a sur-
plus and is projected to do so for at least an-
other decade. More important, Social Security
has a large and politically powerful constitu-
ency that fears change. But the demographic
trends underlying the longer-run actuarial
imbalance are inescapable, and the longer re-
forms are delayed, the more costly and dis-
ruptive the changes will be.
Unfortunately, the implementation of ben-
efit cuts and/or tax increases designed to avoid
insolvency will exacerbate the problem of fall-
ing returns. New approaches must be found
to address both the actuarial imbalance and
the falling return on contributions; otherwise,
the Social Security system will not be sup-
ported by young people, who are already con-
cerned that the system will provide little or no
benefit for them.1
CRITERIA FOR REFORM
The Social Security Administration’s inter-
mediate, or “best estimate,” projection indi-
cates that payroll taxes would have to be raised
(or benefits cut) immediately by nearly 18 per-
cent just to maintain the system’s solvency
over the next 75 years.2 Larger changes would
be needed if action is delayed. Satisfactorily
dealing with the rate of return, or “money’s-
worth,” problem would involve even more
fundamental changes in the system.3 Thus,
given the magnitude and scope of needed
changes, there must be agreement before re-
form is undertaken on the fundamental objec-
tives of Social Security and its relation to the
broader issue of national retirement policy.
The topic of national retirement policies
was addressed by CED in a recent policy state-
1. See for example, the Bozell poll conducted by KRC Research
and Consulting, Aug. 10-18, 1996 as reported in US News and
World Report. October 28, 1996, p. 68.
2. Specifically, a 2.19 percentage point increase in the OASDI
tax rate, from 12.4 to 14.6, would restore fiscal balance if it were
enacted immediately. See Social Security Administration, 1996
Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996),   p. 129.
3. As we explained in Chapter 2, the “money’s worth” concept
can be measured in several ways. For example, some studies
emphasize the internal rate of return, calculated as the interest
rate, which, when applied to contributions, equals the present
value of expected benefits. The most familiar “money’s worth”
concept is the number of years of benefits needed to recover all
contributions.
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ment, Who Will Pay For Your Retirement? The
Looming Crisis (1995). In that statement, CED
urged policy makers to give top priority to the
economic security of future retirees through
policies that raise national saving, especially
saving for retirement. CED stated that it is
incumbent upon government and business to
fully fund pension commitments to their em-
ployees and to encourage increased participa-
tion in retirement programs as well as in-
creased saving by individuals. Numerous
specific changes in regulatory and tax policy
were proposed to reduce the high costs of
administering private retirement programs.
The statement also recommended that gov-
ernment and business launch a massive edu-
cational program to inform workers about the
need to take greater responsibility for their
own retirement.4 A more recent CED state-
ment, American Workers and Economic Change
(1996), addressed changes in labor markets,
including the trend toward early retirement
and large layoffs at established firms. CED
urged changes in retirement policy to im-
prove the portability of retirement assets and
to encourage individual responsibility.5 Re-
forms of Social Security should be consis-
tent with the broad economic objectives iden-
tified in these CED statements.
Considering the important role that Social
Security plays in our society, CED recom-
mends the following criteria for evaluating
proposed changes in the system.
• Social Security should provide a minimum
retirement income, that is, a safety net, for
all workers and their families.
• A fundamental objective of Social Security
reform is to increase national saving, so
that the burden of supporting rising num-
bers of elderly is made less onerous by
more rapid capital accumulation and eco-
nomic growth.
• Social Security reform should not derail
the critical economic objective of eliminat-
ing deficits in the federal budget.
• The Social Security benefit structure should
retain an element of income redistribu-
tion, whereby the ratio of benefits to con-
tributions is higher for lower-income work-
ers.
• Participation in the Social Security system
by workers should be universal because
the burden of supporting the redistribu-
tion and insurance elements of Social Secu-
rity should be shared as broadly as pos-
sible.
• Reform measures should be administra-
tively feasible, should not raise adminis-
trative costs significantly, and every effort
should be made to minimize costs arising
from investments in private assets.
• Social Security reform should strive for
greater equity between generations and
for better returns on contributions than
the present system will provide for future
retirees.
• It should also seek greater equity among
current participants, particularly between
workers with nonworking spouses and
other retirees.
• Reform measures should minimize disin-
centives for labor force participation by
the elderly and encourage private saving.
• Changes that have a continuing positive
effect on the system’s actuarial balance and
provide automatic responses to changed
circumstances (such as a larger-than-an-
ticipated increase in life expectancy) are
preferable to one-time changes that merely
postpone insolvency.
• Changes in Social Security benefits should
be enacted promptly and phased in gradu-
ally. Workers need reasonably accurate in-
formation concerning expected Social Se-
curity income in order to make informed
decisions about retirement saving and re-
tirement age, and they require adequate
4. See Who Will Pay For Your Retirement? The Looming Crisis,
p. 11.
5. American Workers and Economic Change, p. 56.
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lead time to plan and adjust their behavior
to any changes in the system.
Of course, no reform proposal can fully
satisfy all these criteria because there are un-
avoidable trade-offs. For example, cuts in ben-
efits would be likely to increase both public
and private saving, but such cuts would also
reduce the economic security of retirees.
Some have argued that the combination of
insurance elements and income redistribution
in the Social Security retirement program has
made the system both inequitable and ineffi-
cient. They favor reforms that would convert
Social Security into a pure retirement program
in which benefits depend strictly on contribu-
tions; the current income redistribution func-
tion of Social Security would be dealt with by
other government welfare programs, if at all.
But as suggested by the criteria for reform
described above, CED believes that Social
Security should continue to provide an ad-
equate safety net for all participants. This
requires continuation of the income redistri-
bution characteristics of the program, which
has helped to dramatically reduce poverty
among the elderly. However, this does not
preclude proposals for the division of Social
Security into two components: (1) a safety net
that includes both redistribution and insur-
ance against the loss of retirement income and
(2) a mandatory personal retirement account
(PRA), which provides retirement benefits
from contributions accumulated in the account.
The adoption of such a dual system would
satisfy most of the reform criteria favored by
CED.
REFORM OPTIONS
Although Congress and the Administra-
tion have been discussing reforms of entitle-
ment programs in the health and welfare fields,
some members of Congress regard the OASI
retirement program, the largest of the federal
entitlement programs, as the “third rail” of
American politics that cannot be touched with-
out risking political defeat. But attitudes may
be changing. In 1995, Senators Robert Kerrey
and John Danforth, co-chairmen of the Bipar-
tisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Re-
form, endorsed substantial reforms in Social
Security.6 More recently, the quadrennial Ad-
visory Council on Social Security, whose mem-
bers include representatives from labor, busi-
ness, academia, and the public, also set forth
fairly radical reform options. No single pro-
posal was supported by a majority of the mem-
bers of the Council, but, for the first time, a
majority did propose reforms that involve the
creation of individual saving accounts.7
Most proposals for reforming Social Secu-
rity can be divided into three categories: (a)
changes that improve the actuarial balance of
the current system, (b) reforms that deal with
economic efficiency and equity within a single
generation, and (c) policies that raise the rate
of return on contributions and improve
intergenerational equity. The priority CED at-
taches to proposed reforms in each category
and the specific reform strategy recommended
by CED are discussed in the remainder of this
chapter.
CED’s HIGH-PRIORITY REFORMS FOR
RESTORING ACTUARIAL BALANCE
IN THE EXISTING PROGRAM
According to the Social Security Adminis-
tration, if no changes are made in current
law, benefits could be funded at only 70 to
75 percent of current levels when trust funds
are exhausted. Thus, substantial changes in
present policies are needed to restore the
system’s balance. CED believes that top pri-
ority should be given to the following
6. Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform, Fi-
nal Report to the President, 1995. The Kerrey-Danforth proposals
for the Social Security retirement program included an increase
in the normal retirement age, reduced growth in initial benefits
especially for upper-income workers, reduced COLAs, and the
creation of personal retirement accounts. After the retirement
of Senator Danforth, former Senator Alan Simpson joined
Senator Kerrey in a similar proposal.
7. Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security
Reform (January 1997).
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options: (1) a reduction in the growth of the
primary insurance amount (PIA), the first-
year benefit received by a worker retiring at
the normal retirement age (NRA); (2) an in-
crease in the number of years of employ-
ment included in the calculation of the PIA;
(3) an increase in the NRA beyond that al-
ready legislated; and (4) increased taxation
of Social Security benefits. Given the Social
Security Administration’s intermediate pro-
jections, the combined effect of these prior-
ity changes would exceed the minimum re-
quired to eliminate the 75-year actuarial
imbalance in the OASDI system. As noted
elsewhere, CED’s objective is to maintain fis-
cal balance for many years beyond the projec-
tion period and to provide a cushion for pos-
sible projection errors.
1. REDUCING THE GROWTH OF THE
INITIAL BENEFIT (PIA).  The highest prior-
ity for bringing the Social Security system into
actuarial balance is to slow the increase in the
primary insurance amount (PIA), the initial
benefit received by an individual who starts
receiving benefits at the normal retirement
age.8 This could be done either by reducing
the rate of growth of income brackets in the
initial benefit formula or by reducing the ben-
efit rates applicable to each bracket.
As explained in Chapter 2, initial Social
Security benefits rise more rapidly than infla-
tion because the PIA increases with wages,
not prices. The system was designed to hold
replacement ratios constant.9 But constant re-
placement ratios cannot be financed in the
future on a pay-as-you-go basis unless tax
rates are raised sharply, because the worker-
retiree ratio will fall dramatically when the
baby boomers retire. CED believes that a
gradual reduction in the growth of first-year
benefits — that is, a decline in replacement
ratios — is far more attractive than raising
payroll tax rates, especially if it is done with-
out reducing monthly benefits for low-in-
come individuals. One frequently proposed
approach, for example, is to adopt a formula
that seeks to achieve constant real benefits
rather than constant replacement ratios, which
could be achieved by indexing the PIA “bend
points” to prices instead of wages.10 This ap-
proach would lead to a large long-run reduc-
tion in costs. However, it may be more desir-
able to structure a PIA change in a manner
that permits some growth in real benefits, es-
pecially for low-income workers.11 One method
proposed by some members of the Advisory
Council on Social Security involves reducing
the replacement ratios for the two higher-in-
come PIA brackets. This change achieves a
larger slowing in the growth of benefits for
higher- than for lower-income beneficiaries.12
Specifically, the 90 percent replacement rate
applicable to the first threshold (the first $426
in 1996) would be unchanged. The 32 and 15
percent benefit rates applicable to higher in-
come levels would be reduced by 0.5 percent-
age points for the years 1998 to 2011 and by 1.5
percentage points for the years 2012 to 2030.
Thereafter, these rates would be 22.4 and 10.5
percent, respectively. CED believes that this
method of reducing the growth in initial ben-
8. Reducing the PIA produces a proportionate reduction in the
benefit received by those who take early retirement.
9. The replacement ratio is the ratio of first-year retirement
benefits to final-year income. Because increases in productivity
generate real wage growth, linking PIA to wages rather than
prices leads (with a lag) to increases in real benefits. This makes
it difficult to fully resolve the solvency problem with increased
economic growth. Moreover, even if real wages do not in-
crease, real lifetime benefits will rise along with life expectancy
if the normal retirement age is not raised.
10. “Bend points” are the points at which the replacement rates
applied to the calculated average indexed monthly earnings
(AIME) change. These bend points are now indexed by wage
growth. In 1996, the income brackets were $0 to $425, $426 to
$2,567, and amounts above $2,567. The benefit rates (or replace-
ment ratios) applied to each bracket are 90, 32, and 15 percent,
respectively.
11. The Social Security Administration’s best projection as-
sumes that real wages will grow by 1 percent a year beginning
in 2000, suggesting that the purchasing power of the average
wage will rise by more than 100 percent over the 75-year pro-
jection period. Thus, if the PIA were indexed to the CPI to just
maintain the real value of benefits, total spending would be
considerably lower over the longer term.
12. This change is supported by the chairman of the Advisory
Council (Edward Gramlich, Dean of the School of Public Policy,
University of Michigan) and one other member. Report of the
1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security (January 1997).
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efits is reasonable and equitable and there-
fore recommends its adoption. This change
alone would reduce the system’s 75-year actu-
arial deficit by about 60 percent (Table 3, page
40).
2. INCREASING THE YEARS OF COV-
ERED EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY TO
RECEIVE FULL BENEFITS. At present, those
who have 35 qualified years can receive as
large a benefit as those who work more years.
CED endorses the gradual increase in the
number of years of contributions included
in the calculated average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME) from 35 to 40 years. This
change would result in a further reduction in
the average PIA since years of lower or no
earnings would be added to the calculation of
the AIME for most workers. This change would
eliminate about 20 percent of the actuarial im-
balance.
3. RAISING THE RETIREMENT AGE.
Another high-priority reform for restoring the
actuarial balance of Social Security should be
a gradual increase in the normal retirement
age beyond that currently legislated. The
scheduled increase in the NRA only partially
compensates for past and expected increases
in life span. Thus, as life expectancy rises be-
yond the scheduled increase in the NRA, cur-
rent law will permit automatic increases in
lifetime benefits. Considering both the past
and expected future increases in life expect-
ancy and improvements in the health of the
elderly, a further increase in the NRA is widely
perceived as a desirable reform. The NRA is
now scheduled to rise 2 months per year from
2000 until 2005, to hold constant at 66 from
2005 until 2017, when it will begin rising again
by 2 months per year until it reaches 67 in
2023. CED prefers a continuous two-month
per year rise in the NRA beginning in 2000,
until it reaches 70 in the year 2030. Increases
in the NRA thereafter should be linked (in-
dexed) to changes in average life expectancy
in a way that maintains a constant average
ratio of working years to retirement years.
This reduction in benefits, relative to current
law, would eliminate about 44 percent of the
75-year actuarial deficit in the present pro-
gram.
CED believes that an extended work life
will be a necessity for most workers in the
future. Nevertheless, CED does not favor an
increase in the early eligible age (EEA), which
is now 62 years, because some jobs are too
strenuous for older workers, and such a
change is likely to result in a significant in-
crease in applications for disability benefits.
Of course, benefits at early retirement should
be reduced actuarially to reflect the number
of years of retirement before the normal re-
tirement age. (The actuarial adjustment would
ensure that the total expected lifetime benefit
is not affected by early retirement.) Those re-
tiring at age 62 currently receive about 80 per-
cent of the benefit at age 65. If the present
actuarial adjustment is retained, whereby early
retirement benefits are reduced by 6.67 per-
cent for each year below the NRA, the penalty
for early retirement at age 62 will rise as the
NRA increases. When the NRA reaches 70
years, for example, the reduction in benefits
would be about 50 percent. Such a large re-
duction in benefits for those who choose early
retirement should encourage individuals to
work longer or to save more to finance their
early retirement.
4. TAXING SOCIAL SECURITY BEN-
EFITS. Employer contributions to Social Se-
curity are a deductible expense, but individual
Social Security contributions are paid from
after-tax income. Consequently, taxation of all
benefits would involve some double taxation.
Social Security benefits were not subject to the
federal income tax until 1983, when reforms
established taxation of a portion of Social Se-
curity income. The actual percentage of ben-
efits subject to federal income tax depends
upon the income of the beneficiary. Currently,
couples (individuals) with combined income13
13. Combined income is the sum of adjusted gross income, non-
taxable interest income, and one-half of Social Security
benefits.
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Table 3
Estimated Impact of Social Security Reforms on the Actuarial Balance of the
OASDI Program
Category Illustrative Policy Change
CED Priority Primary Insurance Amount  (PIA) Reduce growth in PIA for middle- and
Reforms upper-income workers. 60%
Normal Retirement Age (NRA) Increase the NRA from 65 to 70 years.
The NRA would be raised 2 months each
year from 2000 to 2030.  Index NRA to
changes in life expectancy after 2030. 44
Years of covered employment Gradually increase years of covered
employment included in calculation of PIA
from 35 to 40. 20
Taxation of benefits Tax all benefits above the amount of the
employee’s contributions. This result can be
approximated by counting 85% of benefits
as taxable income for all taxpayers. 9
CPI measurement Improve the accuracy of measured inflation
beyond already implemented 0.21% correction.
(Each additional 0.1% reduction in the CPI
would reduce the actuarial imbalance by
approximately 6%) —
Total Impact of CED Priority Reforms 133%
Recommended Spousal benefits Gradually reduce spousal benefits from
Changes one-half to one-third of worker’s PIA. 8
Retiree earned income Eliminate earned income limitations. -5
State/local government employees Mandatory participation by new state/
local employees. 10
Reforms Payroll tax rate increase Raise payroll tax rate by 1 percentage point
not supported in 1998. 40
Cost-of-living adjustment (COLA)(b) Arbitrarily reduce annual COLA by 0.5%. 30
Means-test benefits Means-test benefits for individuals with income
over $100,000 15
Reduction
in 75-Year
Actuarial
Deficit(a)
(a) Based on the Social Security Administration’s intermediate projection, these estimates show the percentage of 75-year actuarial
deficit that could be financed by each measure.  In 1996, the actuarial deficit (the difference between projected revenues and in-
come) is estimated at 2.19 percent of total payroll. However, the baseline intermediate projection shows large deficits at the end of
the projection period, indicating that the tax change needed to restore solvency permanently is substantially larger.  One estimate
put the tax change necessary to achieve fiscal balance beyond the 75-year calculation period at around 2.5 percent of payroll.
(b) Although CED opposes arbitrary COLA adjustments, we strongly favor methodological changes that would improve the
measurement of inflation.
SOURCE: Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security, Volume 1: Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.:
January 1997), pp. 231-239.
by CED
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below $32,000 ($25,000 for singles) pay no tax
on benefits. Couples with income between
$32,000 and $44,000 ($25,000 to $34,000 for
singles) are taxed on 50 percent of benefits.
Those with incomes above $44,000 (joint) and
$34,000 (single) pay tax on 85 percent of ben-
efits. Income tax revenues derived from Social
Security benefits are currently credited to the
Social Security and HI trust funds.
CED favors tax treatment of Social Security
benefits similar to that for most tax-deferred
private pension income. To achieve similar
treatment, CED favors the gradual phase-in
of reforms that would eliminate current ben-
efit tax thresholds and treat all Social Secu-
rity benefits in excess of the contributions
made by the worker as general taxable in-
come. This could be achieved by including
about 85 percent of all social security benefits
in taxable income — approximately the por-
tion of benefit income that does not represent
previously taxed individual contributions for
recent retirees. As a result of this change in tax
treatment, the actuarial deficit in the Social
Security program would be reduced by about
9 percent.14 Since low-income individuals are
exempt from income taxation, they would not
be affected by this change.
Most of the benefit reductions favored by
CED would have no effect on those already
retired. Only the taxation of benefits would
affect current retirees and thereby improve
equity between the current and future genera-
tion of retirees. Although means testing and
arbitrary COLA reductions could also affect
current retirees, CED believes that these op-
tions, as well as increases in future payroll tax
rates, are less attractive options (“Options for
Restoring Actuarial Balance,” page 42).
Nevertheless, if the Social Security Admin-
istration’s current projections turn out to be
extemely optimistic, it may be necessary to
adopt some of these changes, perhaps tempo-
rarily, in order to achieve actuarial balance.
CED REFORMS PROVIDE A MARGIN
FOR PROJECTION ERROR
The benefit reductions in the existing sys-
tem proposed by CED would be phased in
slowly and affect the system’s outlays gradu-
ally, with large cumulative effects occurring
at the time the system would otherwise be
running out of funds. Because the annual pro-
jections of trust fund balances made by the
Social Security Administration have been
revised downward time and again, the CED
high-priority changes are intended to exceed
the minimum necessary to eliminate the
75-year actuarial deficit by about one-third.
Thus, if the Social Security projections turn
out to be correct, or if improvements in the
measurement of the CPI significantly reduce
the system’s actuarial deficiency, it may be
possible at some future time to terminate the
phase-in of the these changes (or to reduce
payroll taxes, etc.).
ACCURATE MEASUREMENT OF
INFLATION IS IMPORTANT
As explained in “Options for Restoring
Actuarial Balance,” (page 42), CED does not
regard arbitrary cost-of-living (COLA)
reductions as an attractive option, because it
would raise poverty rates substantially for
older retirees. But COLA adjustments should
accurately reflect changes in living costs. Most
economists believe that the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), as currently measured, signifi-
cantly overstates the rise in the cost of living
in the United States. A recent study indicates
that the bias for years immediately ahead
exceeds 1 percentage point.15 Because changes
14. Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security
(January 1997, p. 237).
15. In 1995, Congress appointed an Advisory Commission to
Study the Consumer Price Index, chaired by Professor Michael
Boskin of Stanford University. The findings of the commission
indicate that the forward bias in the CPI measurement of the
cost of living is 1.1 percent points per year, and that the implica-
tions for both federal spending and tax revenues are very sub-
stantial. Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price
Index, Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living, Final
Report to the Senate Finance Committee, December 1996.
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1.  The impact of means testing benefits on the
actuarial balance is potentially quite large.
Means testing would spread the burden of
reform more broadly among age groups, be-
cause it would reduce benefits to current re-
tirees whose benefits, relative to contribu-
tions, greatly exceed those projected for
younger participants. More important, means
testing would shelter the poor from benefit
cuts. But if benefits are reduced for those who
prudently save for retirement, means testing
will also discourage saving. Moreover, means
testing would not have a large effect on total
benefit payments unless it reduced the ben-
efits of middle-income retirees, who would
present strong political opposition to benefit
cuts. They would argue that Social Security
benefits are already progressive, providing
relatively generous benefits for low-income
workers. Means testing would also be diffi-
cult and expensive to administer because of
the problem of determining the income of
beneficiaries. Finally, means testing might
reduce the support for the program by politi-
cally powerful groups.
2.  COLA reductions could have a large effect
on the actuarial balance of the OASI program,
in part because benefits received by current
retirees would be affected. However, Social
Security is the only generally available annu-
ity that fully protects a retiree’s income from
inflation and many believe that it is important
for the economic security of the elderly to
retain this unique feature.(a) COLA reductions
would be most severe for those who live the
longest and have the least opportunity to earn
wages to compensate for reduced benefits.
OPTIONS FOR RESTORING ACTUARIAL BALANCE NOT SUPPORTED BY CED
Retirees over 75 years of age already have
relatively high poverty rates, and COLA re-
ductions would make their situation worse. To
avoid such effects, COLAs could be cut only
for benefits above a basic component — per-
haps benefits above the poverty level of in-
come, but this would raise administrative costs
substantially.
It should be noted, however, that while we
do not regard arbitrary COLA reductions as an
attractive option, CED strongly favors efforts
to improve the measurement of the CPI, upon
which COLAs are based (see pages 41-42).
3.  Raising payroll tax rates could have a large
impact on the system’s actuarial balance but,
at the same time, would also have adverse
effects on labor costs, employment, and on the
system’s progressivity. It would also magnify
the problem of intergenerational inequity be-
cause it would pass the burden of restoring
fiscal balance to younger workers. Increasing
the wage base is not a very attractive alternative
to raising payroll tax rates. The numbers of
participants with incomes above the current
maximum taxable wage are not very large, and
increases in the wage base automatically trig-
ger increases in benefits for higher-income
workers.
(a) At present, the annual automatic cost-of-living adjustment is
equal to the percent change in the CPI. But if the economy
experiences a price shock, such as in the 1973 oil crisis, prices
may rise faster than wages, which could adversely impact real
incomes. Protecting the elderly from loss of income due to such
price shocks is inequitable because it causes the entire burden to
fall on workers and others whose income is not protected by a
COLA. A technical change recommended for the current So-
cial Security system by CED is that COLAs should be based
on the change in the CPI or a wage index, whichever is lower.
in the CPI are the basis for annual COLAs, a
systematic overstatement of the CPI would
exacerbate the projected insolvency of Social
Security and worsen intergenerational ineq-
uity. Over time, even a small measurement
bias has a large cumulative impact on Social
Security benefits. CED believes that it is very
important that the CPI be measured as accu-
rately as possible. We support efforts to im-
prove the accuracy of the CPI and believe
that they should be a high priority.
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HIGH-PRIORITY REFORMS SHOULD
BE ENACTED PROMPTLY AND
PRODUCE A SUSTAINABLE FISCAL
BALANCE
TIMING CAVEATS. Throughout this
statement we have emphasized the need for
prompt action to eliminate the actuarial defi-
ciency in the Social Security retirement sys-
tem. Each year that action is delayed, the cost
of bringing the system into balance will rise.
According to the Social Security actuaries,
delay would raise the cost of restoring the 75-
year actuarial balance, as follows:
Required Required Annual
Reform Increase Percent Increase
Starting in Payroll in Revenues or
Date Tax Rate(a) Cut in Benefits
1996 2.19% 17.7%
2002 2.50 20.5
2012 3.12 25.5
2022 4.04 33.5
(a) Combined employer-employee tax rate. Source: Technical
Panel on Trends and Issues in Retirement Saving, Final Report
to the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security, p. 75, and
The 1996 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds. If the
intermediate projection turns out to be optimistic, as in the
past, the magnitude of future changes needed to restore bal-
ance could be even larger.
These figures indicate that the cost of delay
is very high indeed. Moreover, given the mag-
nitude of the tax increases shown above, which
amount to an 18 to 33 percent increase in pay-
roll tax revenues, we believe that substantial
cuts in benefit growth rates must be part of
any reform to restore solvency. Relying solely
on tax increases would be disruptive and
damaging to labor and product markets. But
benefit cuts must be phased in slowly so that
workers have time to adjust saving and re-
tirement plans. Thus, prompt action is nec-
essary for any proposed reform.
ACHIEVING A SUSTAINABLE FISCAL
BALANCE. The payroll tax rate increases
shown in the table, left, which would be
necessary to restore the system’s 75-year fiscal
balance, do not represent the true dimensions
of the imbalance in the Social Security system,
in part because the demographic situation is
not expected to improve after the projection
period (largely due to the fact that the average
life span is expected to continue to increase).
If a minimum “fix” is put in place, so that the
trust fund is depleted at the end of the projec-
tion period, the system will be out of balance
immediately thereafter. (The operating bal-
ance would have been in deficit for many years
as the trust fund balances are run down.)
Each year, as the projection is moved one year
forward, a deficit year will be added to the
actuarial balance and a surplus year dropped.
As noted by the Advisory Council, the pas-
sage of time itself would cause the actuarial
balance to deteriorate. Not many years would
pass after minimum reforms were made be-
fore policy analysts would be reporting that
the Social Security system needs fixing to elimi-
nate a huge actuarial deficit. Thus, if reform
measures are to have a lasting effect, the
changes needed are considerably larger than
shown in the table, left. That is, the immedi-
ate 2.19 percent actuarial deficit correction
would have to be raised substantially to
achieve permanent balance. For this reason,
CED favors reforms that make an increasing
contribution to the system’s solvency (such
as the indexing of the NRA to life expect-
ancy), rather than measures that only restore
the 75-year balance.
REFORMS TO IMPROVE
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
As a matter of economic efficiency and
equity, CED also recommends the following
reforms:
• CED believes that the limitations on the
earnings of retirees should be eliminated.
Benefits are currently reduced in propor-
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tion to earned income above certain thresh-
olds. (Recent proposals in Congress would
raise the limit, not eliminate it.) The earn-
ings test is very difficult to verify and is
said to be one of the largest sources of error
in the Social Security program. The elimi-
nation of the earnings test would have no
long-run impact on the system’s actuarial
balance. More important, this adjustment
would increase labor market participation
of experienced and skilled workers at a
time when a shortage of such workers is
anticipated.
• Couples who receive both the worker’s ben-
efit and a spousal benefit under the current
system often receive a much higher return
on contributions than the benefit paid when
both partners’ benefits are based on their
own contributions.16 In order to reduce the
inequity between retirees with spouses
who did not work or contribute to Social
Security and other retirees, CED believes
that the non-working spouse’s benefit
should be reduced gradually from one-
half to one-third of the worker’s benefit.
CED does not propose a change in survi-
vors’ benefits (which are 100 percent of
the worker’s benefit for nonworking
spouses).
• Expand Coverage to Include State and Lo-
cal Employees. The Social Security system
redistributes income from high-income re-
tirees to low-income retirees. CED favors
continuation of a redistribution element in
the Social Security program. However, CED
believes that, as a matter of equity, the cost
of redistribution must be widely shared,
and, therefore, coverage should be univer-
sal. Consequently, CED recommends that
all new state and local employees be re-
quired to become participants in the Social
Security system, and that existing employ-
ees be permitted to join on a voluntary
basis.
IMPROVINING THE RETURN ON
CONTRIBUTIONS BY INVESTING
IN PRIVATE SECURITIES
The most practical approach for making
the Social Security retirement program a “bet-
ter deal” for future retirees is to invest contri-
butions in private-sector financial assets.17
Funds invested in corporate bonds and equi-
ties would be expected to yield a higher re-
turn than government bonds, thereby permit-
ting a higher return on contributions. Of
course, it is not likely that everyone would
receive higher returns on their contributions;
higher returns come with higher risk, and there
will be losers as well as winners. For this rea-
son, it is critical that the safety net provided
by the existing Social Security system be pre-
served. Nevertheless, investments in private-
sector financial assets are likely to improve
the “money’s worth” of contributions made
by the majority of younger workers and help
them achieve economic security in retirement.
At the same time, investment in private secu-
rities raises a number of critical issues relating
to (1) ownership and management of funds
and (2) the impact on the federal budget and
national saving.
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
OF FUNDS INVESTED IN PRIVATE
ASSETS
Options relating to the ownership and man-
16. Currently, spouses with no earnings record receive pay-
ments equal to 50 percent of the worker’s PIA. Consequently,
the return on contributions for one-earner couples is much
higher than for singles or two-earner couples who receive no
such subsidy, and two-earner couples may receive smaller ben-
efits than one-earner couples who contributed the same life-
time taxes.
17. The return on payroll tax contributions could also be im-
proved by subsidizing Social Security from general federal
revenues. But this approach would not improve inter-
generational equity or raise national saving; given these con-
siderations as well as present budgetary problems, CED does
not recommend this option.
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agement of investments in private-sector
securities include the following:
1. Invest all or part of the balance in the So-
cial Security’s existing defined benefit plan
(now invested in special Treasury issues)
in private-sector financial assets owned and
directed by the Social Security Trust Fund.
2. Invest additional contributions or a por-
tion of the contributions now made to So-
cial Security in private-sector financial as-
sets managed and held by the Social Secu-
rity Administration but credited to indi-
viduals in accounts that permit limited in-
vestment choices.
3. Permit additional contributions (or a por-
tion of the existing contributions now made
to Social Security) to be placed in privately
owned and held accounts, which are in-
vested in and limited to acceptable asset
types, subject to existing regulations and
appropriate additional restrictions such as
requiring the preservation of funds for re-
tirement only.
4. The same as Option 3 above, except that
government supervision is more limited,
similar to that for 401(k) accounts.
Options 2, 3, and 4 could also require full
or partial annuitization of accumulated assets
upon retirement.
Proponents of the first option believe that
government ownership of private financial
securities would involve low management
costs (similar to costs currently experienced
by the Social Security Administration) and
higher returns. Those who favor the second
option often cite the experience of the Federal
Retirement Thrift Investment Board, which
has achieved reasonable returns on privately
invested federal employee retirement accounts
while maintaining low management costs.18
(See “The Federal Thrift Savings Plan, page
46.)
Advocates of the third option point to the
highly developed and successful financial
markets in the United States as evidence of
the ability of private institutions to manage
these funds efficiently. For reasons described
below, CED favors Option 3 — privately
owned, held, and managed accounts with
the option to invest in mutual funds that
hold private securities, subject to certain
regulations, described later in this chapter.
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND/OR
CONTROL OF PRAs IS REJECTED BY CED.
The proposal for government ownership of
Social Security trust fund assets invested in
private financial instruments raises difficult
questions about (a) potential political interfer-
ence with private investment decisions, (b)
the independence of business under govern-
ment ownership, and (c) the socialization of
risk.
There is a serious risk that government
managers of such funds could not avoid po-
litical pressures to apply social criteria to the
selection of investments. There would be
political pressure to carry out government poli-
cies by directed investments even if this
reduces the returns on the investments. To
avoid political influence in investment deci-
sions, some have proposed a requirement that
federal government investments in private
securities be limited to so-called “indexed
funds,” that are passively invested in a large
group of securities.19 But this practice would
not necessarily eliminate political interference
since choices among indexed funds could be
influenced politically and exceptions to the
requirement for indexed funds could be legis-
lated (e.g., tobacco stocks).
With government ownership of large
equity holdings, questions would arise regard-
18. The costs of managing private investments in the Federal
Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees are very low, in part
because investments are limited to only three funds. (See “The
Federal Thrift Savings Plan, page 46.)
19. Indexed funds typically attempt to mimic the performance
of a broad index such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 or the
Russell 2000 by investing proportionately in the securities in-
cluded in the index.
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The Federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) is a
defined contribution retirement savings
account that was established by Congress for
federal employees in 1986. Participants, who
receive matching funds from their respective
federal agencies, have three investment
options: the Government Securities Invest-
ment (G) Fund, the Common Stock Index
Investment (C) Fund, and the Fixed Income
Investment (F) Fund.(a)  The G Fund is com-
prised exclusively of short-term nonmarket-
able U.S. Treasury securities.  The C Fund is
an indexed equity fund with a portfolio based
on the S&P 500.  The F Fund, or the U.S.
Debt Index Fund, aims to match the Lehman
Brothers Bond Index, which includes fixed
income securities, such as government and
corporate bonds, and mortgage-related assets.
The C and F Funds are managed by BZW
Barclays Global Investors, N.A. Barclays was
selected as the fund manager through a com-
petitive bidding process and is subject to
review by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Department of Labor, the Federal
Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency.
The expense ratios of all three funds are
relatively low due to the size of the funds and
have declined significantly  as contributions
have grown.(b)  The C and F Fund expense
ratios include TSP administrative expenses as
well as management fees and trading costs.
The G Fund’s costs are based solely on admin-
istrative costs; this fund is not charged trading
or management fees since government securi-
ties are purchased directly from the Treasury.
Average Returns and Expense Ratios
Compound
Annual Rate Expense
(over life Ratios
TSP Fund of fund) = (1995)
G Fund
(government
securities) 7.8% 0.09%
C Fund
(S&P 500 Index) 15.0% 0.10%
F Fund
(LBA Index,
fixed income) 9.0% 0.11%
Compound
annual inflation
rate (CPI) 3.6%
=  These figures are for January 1988 through December
1995. The C and F Funds’ first investments took place in
January 1988. The first G Fund investment was in April
1987.
SOURCE: Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board,
Guide to TSP Investments (Washington, D.C.: May 1996),
and Summary of the Thrift Savings Plan for Federal Employees
(July 1995).
(a) The first 3 percent of contributions is matched 100 percent,
the next 2 percent is matched 50 percent.  The limit on contribu-
tions for FERS employees is the lesser of 10 percent or $9,500.
For CSRS employees (those hired before 1985 who chose to
remain in the old defined benefit plan), the limit is a 5 percent
contribution.
(b) TSP funds in the Barclays C Fund were $11.5 billion, with
the total fund holding $41.5 billion.  The TSP holds $2.2 billion
of a total $12.2 billion in the Barclays F Fund.  The G Fund held
$22.4 billion in assets in May 1996.
THE FEDERAL THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN: INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT INVESTMENTS
ing who would exercise stockholder voting
rights. The enormous size of the Social Secu-
rity trust funds could make Social Security
the largest stockholder of many firms, which
could lead to government influence in private
industries. Government managers of such
funds might feel an obligation to involve them-
selves in certain corporate decisions, as is the
case with state-owned pension funds. But the
20. Under one plan advocated by members of the Advisory
Council on Social Security, federal ownership of private securi-
ties is projected to approximate 7 percent of the total equity
market by 2014.
potential impact of federal control would be
much more pervasive because state pension
funds are small relative to the potential size of
privately invested Social Security funds.20 The
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possibility of federal government influence
on private firms, through its large holding of
publicly held private financial resources, is
an unnecessary and undesirable risk for the
U.S. economy.
Another issue involves the distribution of
risk. If private securities were owned by gov-
ernment on behalf of investors, losses would
tend to be “socialized” — that is, forced on
taxpayers. By contrast, if the funds were pri-
vately owned, individuals would have the
opportunity to choose (within some limits)
the level of risk that they find acceptable.21
Not only does CED oppose government
ownership of private securities, we also be-
lieve that the proposal for government to
hold and control private financial securities
in the name of individuals is not an appro-
priate option. Even if such financial assets are
credited to the accounts of individuals, it
would be difficult to insulate them from gov-
ernment influence or budgetary juggling. One
example was provided in late 1995 when Con-
gress refused to raise the federal debt limit
and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin delayed
interest payments and withdrew funds from
the individual accounts of federal employees
to avoid default on the nation’s debt.22
CED prefers the creation of personal re-
tirement accounts (PRAs), owned by (or at-
tributed to) individuals, held privately, and
invested in financial assets selected by indi-
viduals, subject to regulations described in
the “Summary of Recommendations,” pages
16-18. Undoubtedly many would choose to
hold a portion of their funds in equities. It is
likely that such accumulated funds, annuitized
and withdrawn only at retirement, would pro-
vide higher retirement income than invest-
ments in government securities exclusively.23
Young workers, who believe that government
will not keep its promises with respect to So-
cial Security benefits, could feel more confi-
dent about their economic security if they have
a PRA account because they would own the
funds.
SAFETY NET AND DEFICIT
CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR AN
“ADD-ON” ACCOUNT RATHER
THAN “PRIVATIZATION” OF
SOCIAL SECURITY
Some have proposed converting the Social
Security retirement program into a private re-
tirement program by placing existing payroll
tax revenues into private accounts, similar to
PRAs. CED opposes such “privatization” of
Social Security because a private program
could not easily provide all the “safety net”
features of Social Security that are necessary
to protect the poor. The unique features of
Social Security include redistribution from
higher- to low-income workers and inflation
indexation of basic benefits. Moreover, exist-
ing payroll tax revenues will be needed for
some time to finance benefits for current
retirees and older workers under the current
system.
Even partial privatization — that is, divert-
ing a significant portion of existing payroll tax
revenues to private accounts — would raise
serious problems. If PRAs are financed by
“carving out” a substantial portion of the
21. Some also question the ability of government managers to
attain market returns consistently. The massive investments
made by Social Security would be highly visible, and decision
variables concerning purchases and sales would be known
from easily available data. As a result, securities markets would
be able to anticipate buying and selling, which would tend to
bid the price up or down beforehand. The Social Security
Administration would buy at higher prices and sell at lower
prices than smaller, less visible groups, thereby reducing ex-
pected returns. See Lawrence J. White, Investing the Assets of the
Social Security Trust Funds in Equity Securities: An Analysis. The
Investment Company Institute, May 1996, p. 12.
22. In November and December 1995, the Treasury shifted
federal pension assets into cash and later withheld interest due
the civil service retirement fund. Funds were withdrawn from
the employees’ defined contribution fund (the so-called “G
Fund”). Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1995, p. A2.
23. The real return on equities has exceeded the return on
government bonds by about 4.7 percent during the past cen-
tury according to estimates made for the Advisory Council on
Social Security. However, there have been periods of about a
decade when returns on equities did not exceed the return on
bonds, and there is no guarantee that such a large differential
will be realized in the future.
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present payroll tax and benefits under the ex-
isting system are maintained, the budget defi-
cit would rise massively. If, for example, half
of FY1995 OASI payroll taxes had been di-
verted to PRAs and no other action were taken,
the total federal deficit, as conventionally mea-
sured, would have nearly doubled.24 Thus,
under a “carve out” system, national saving
would not rise unless other taxes are increased
(or spending cut) to pay for the benefits of
older participants under the existing program.
Many proposals for “carve-out “ systems
actually do include an additional tax, com-
bined with a large increase in the budget defi-
cit, to finance benefits under the old system.
(In some cases, the tax increase is left in place
long after the transition so that the additional
debt can eventually be retired. Of course, it
may be politically difficult or impossible to
achieve and to maintain these taxes.) Using
debt this way to fund continuing obligations
would impose a huge burden on future gen-
erations. To avoid the appearance of annual
federal deficits, some have proposed that debt
financing take the form of “recognition bonds”
issued to participants in the existing system.
But this mechanism would not reduce the fu-
ture burden; recognition bonds would still be
redeemed when holders of these bonds retire,
and at that time, the Treasury would still have
to raise taxes, cut spending, or issue new debt.
Of course, it can be argued that the in-
crease in private saving resulting from PRA
accounts would ease the problem of financing
future budget deficits, and that any increase
in the Treasury’s debt resulting from divert-
ing payroll taxes to PRAs simply reveals the
true size of the future liability. However, there
is a tangible difference between government
debt and the government’s liability for fu-
ture Social Security benefits: Future Social
Security benefits can be, and frequently are,
changed by legislation, as recommended in
this report. For example, in 1983, Congress
reduced future liabilities substantially by in-
creasing the normal retirement age for future
retirees. Often, small program changes can
have a large cumulative effect on liabilities.
By comparison, federal bonds (which would
include “recognition bonds”) are a contrac-
tual debt obligation that cannot be legislated
away without very serious consequences. If
present projections prove to be optimistic and
benefit cuts are called for in the future, the
existence of a contractual obligation in the
form of “recognition bonds” would tie the
hands of future policy makers. Moreover, in
contrast to a potential liability, publicly held
federal debt must be financed by credit mar-
kets, which has direct implications for com-
peting credit demands. Interest costs result-
ing from a large increase in the debt would, by
themselves, be an enormous burden, placing
severe limitations on federal budget policy.
In our view, the adverse budgetary conse-
quences of employing a “carve out” approach
to finance private accounts are inescapable.
Thus, CED prefers the “add-on” approach,
whereby the PRA system is an addition to a
solvent defined benefit system financed by
the current payroll tax. Although contribu-
tions to PRAs would receive favorable tax
treatment, there is no reason to expect that
budget deficits would be affected in a sub-
stantial way by the creation of PRAs, because
they do not divert existing payroll taxes. With
an add-on system, the existing payroll tax
would be available to pay for the benefits of
current retirees and older participants. But if
policy makers prefer to divert present pay-
roll taxes to finance PRAs, we believe that it
is imperative that such proposals be accom-
panied by specific recommendations for con-
temporaneous federal spending cuts and/or
tax increases to ensure that a rise in the bud-
get deficit (government dissaving) does not
offset the increase in private saving.
24. The federal budget deficit in FY1995 was $164 billion. The
OASI payroll tax revenues amounted to $289 billion, which
together with interest (and other) income yielded $326 billion
of income. Cash outgo amounted to $294 billion, leaving a
surplus of $32 billion. If half of payroll tax revenues ($145
billion) had been diverted to private accounts, the federal defi-
cit would have been about $309 billion, excluding increased
interest costs.
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THE IMPACT OF THE TWO-TIER
SYSTEM ON SAVING
An important advantage of the two-tier
system is that it would generate an increase in
national saving. Why would saving rise? To
begin with, by making the existing program
solvent, future federal deficits would be sub-
stantially smaller, thereby raising national sav-
ing. PRAs will also generate new saving. Of
course, to the extent that individuals and busi-
nesses substitute PRAs for other saving, by
shifting saving from other financial instru-
ments or by reducing contributions to private
pensions and 401(k)s, for example, there would
be no increase in private saving. Nor would
the shifting of pension funds from Treasury
bonds to private securities by itself raise sav-
ing.25 However, we believe that PRAs would
increase private and national saving substan-
tially, if certain conditions are met: (1) contri-
butions to PRA accounts must be mandatory;
(2) access to these funds must be limited to
retirement purposes only, and accumulated
funds must not be available as collateral for
loans; and (3) the federal deficit must not rise
substantially due to the design of PRAs.
PRAs must be mandatory in order to en-
sure an increase in national saving. A large
number of workers, who currently have little
or no savings and are not already contribut-
ing to pension funds, would have no choice
but to reduce consumption and increase sav-
ing. Many others have very small savings and,
therefore, they would soon run out of funds to
shift into PRAs. The requirement that the funds
be tied up until retirement would result in
large accumulations, and the preclusion of
their use as collateral for loans would provide
a substantial boost to saving. It is hoped that
compulsory saving would introduce workers
to the habit of saving and a greater under-
standing of investments and, thereby, encour-
age them to save beyond the minimal required
amount.
As noted in Chapter 2, many economists
believe that the unfunded Social Security
system discourages private saving. If so,
decreased reliance on the defined benefit
component of Social Security for retirement
income may raise saving.26 The reduced reli-
ance on the traditional Social Security pro-
gram may also encourage increased saving by
government. Unlike the Social Security sur-
plus, the funds placed in privately owned
accounts would not be available to govern-
ment to finance spending.
THE CED PROPOSAL
CED favors a Social Security retirement
system that continues to protect the basic
economic security of all retirees, but which
also is actuarially sound, encourages saving,
and offers an opportunity for future retirees
to receive a reasonable return on their contri-
butions. To achieve this, two changes are nec-
essary. First, the high-priority reforms recom-
mended by CED to restore the solvency of the
existing defined benefit system (such as the
reduction in the growth of the PIA and the
increase in the NRA) must be enacted
promptly. Second, supplementary mandatory
contributions to a personal retirement account
(PRA) must be instituted. With these changes,
the present program will evolve into a two-
tier system comprised of (a) a solvent defined
benefit program, which is less generous to
middle and upper income retirees, but at the
same time provides an acceptable basic eco-
nomic safety net for all participants, and (b) a
new defined contribution plan (PRA) that
offers an opportunity for higher returns on
contributions.
THE BASIC DEFINED BENEFIT SYS-
TEM. For the foreseeable future, the defined
benefit component of Social Security would
25. Although a reduction in funds available to government and
an increase in funds available to private investors would not
directly affect national saving, it could affect the relative yield
on private and government investments.
26. Although many economists believe that Social Security
reduces saving, there is considerable disagreement and uncer-
tainty about the size of the impact.
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be financed entirely by payroll taxes at their
existing rates. In the long run, however, it
may be possible to lower payroll tax rates
once the reforms proposed by CED have elimi-
nated the system’s fiscal imbalance. The re-
duction in the growth of the PIA, the increase
in the NRA, and other changes described ear-
lier would restore the actuarial balance of the
existing system by gradually slowing the
growth of outlays. The basic benefit would be
both an assurance of at least a minimum
income in retirement and a mechanism for
redistributing income. For long-time lower-
income participants, there would be no reduc-
tion in replacement rates at the normal retire-
ment age, because benefits would continue to
rise with incomes. The differential between
benefits for high-income and low-income
recipients would be reduced significantly com-
pared to the current situation.
The major characteristics of the reformed
basic defined benefit system would be as
follows:
• The defined benefit program would retain
most of its present characteristics: The pay-
roll tax would remain unchanged and ben-
efits would be similar to the present sys-
tem, though the growth of benefits would
slow, for upper- and middle- income indi-
viduals, and the age and work require-
ments to receive full benefits would be
raised.
• Even for upper- and middle-income par-
ticipants, real first-year benefits are not ex-
pected to decline, assuming that they are
long-term workers who retire at the nor-
mal age. Basic benefits for a low-wage
worker will continue to grow in real terms
and would be at least 80 to 90 percent of
the poverty income level. The combination
of the basic benefit and PRAs would raise
income above the poverty level for low-
income, long-time contributors.
• As is true now, the basic benefit, once
drawn, would be fully indexed for infla-
tion to ensure that it does not lose value in
real terms, thereby preventing the real in-
come of retirees from falling as they be-
come older. (Of course, COLAs should be
based on accurately measured changes in
the cost of living.)
Spousal benefits, but not survivors ben-
efits, under the defined benefit plan would be
reduced gradually from 50 to 33 percent of
PIA in order to improve equity between work-
ers and nonworkers.
Payroll tax rates would remain at present
levels at least until projected Social Security
tax revenues and trust fund balances exceed
the amount needed to finance benefits under
the reformed basic program. If current long-
run projections are correct, the reforms
favored by CED would be more than suffi-
cient to restore actuarial balance. Eventually,
policy makers would have the option of
reducing payroll taxes or raising basic ben-
efits (halting the phase-in of further benefit
cuts). However, given the uncertainty in the
outlook, implementation of such changes
should be delayed. If, after a few decades of
experience, it is determined that this projec-
tion will be realized, policy makers could then
exercise this option.
The trust fund balance in the basic defined
benefit system would remain invested in
special Treasury issues. But to ensure that the
annual surplus is not used to finance govern-
ment spending, federal deficit targets should
gradually be changed to exclude the Social
Security surplus.
A more detailed description of the specific
reform measures included in the CED pro-
posal is provided in the Summary of Recom-
mendations, pages 16-18.
THE PERSONAL RETIREMENT AC-
COUNT (PRA). The personal retirement
account proposed by CED would be a private
defined contribution plan. PRA accounts
would be owned by or attributed to individual
participants. Contributions could be invested
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in a limited number of private broad-based
financial funds. Benefits would be paid from
funds accumulated over the retiree’s lifetime.
PRAs would be funded by mandatory contri-
butions amounting to 3.0 percent of covered
wages, with 1.5 percent paid by both the em-
ployee and employer. Though contributions
to PRAs would be mandatory, they would not
be properly classified as a tax because they
would not affect federal revenues or outlays
directly.
For a variety of reasons, some additional
government regulation of personal retirement
savings accounts would be required:
• In providing appropriate safeguards for
PRAs, while minimizing the need for new
regulations, maximum use should be made
of existing ERISA regulations governing
private pensions, 401(k) and IRA saving
plans, revised as needed.
• To assure that PRA accounts will be used
for their specific intended purpose —
namely, to provide retirement income for
the full retirement years of the participant
and spouse — CED favors rules applicable
to PRAs that (1) prohibit withdrawals or
borrowing of PRA funds before retirement
and (2) ensure that funds are withdrawn
gradually over the life of the participant
after retirement. (This would occur, for ex-
ample, if PRA fund balances were
annuitized at retirement.)
• Because contributions to PRAs would be
mandatory, even for low-income and part-
time workers, many accounts would have
low balances and would be owned by indi-
viduals with little experience in invest-
ments. Consequently, regulatory authori-
ties must be concerned about the adminis-
trative feasibility and costs associated with
individual accounts, as well as the quality
of investments in individual accounts. One
approach would be to limit investment
choices to specific mutual funds, at least
until participants gain more experience.
However, investment choices must be
broad enough to minimize possible dis-
torting effects in capital markets.
• For employers who now manage pension
funds for their employees, it may be neces-
sary to create separate “side-car” accounts
for PRA contributions in order to comply
with the additional restrictions applicable
to PRAs.
Contributions to PRAs would receive tax
treatment similar to 401(k)s. These mandatory
contributions would not limit in any way the
level of tax preference currently available to
many voluntary retirement saving programs.
IMPROVED SECURITY FOR WORKERS
WITHOUT PENSIONS. An important aspect
of the CED program is that it would provide
greater economic security for part-time or con-
tingent workers and others who do not have
access to a private pension. Like the basic de-
fined benefit plan, PRAs would be fully por-
table. All funds contributed to PRAs by em-
ployers and employees would be immediately
and fully vested in individual accounts.
IMPACT OF PRAs ON EMPLOYER
COSTS AND ON THE SELF-EMPLOYED.
Although contributions to PRAs are techni-
cally not a tax, the 1.5 percent employer con-
tribution to PRAs mandated by the plan would
raise labor costs for some firms. However,
those that already contribute to pension plans
might choose to substitute contributions to
PRAs for existing contributions to 401(k)s or
other plans, and in such cases, there would be
no significant increase in costs (and, as noted
earlier, no increase in retirement saving). But
the employer contribution to PRAs could con-
stitute an additional labor cost: (1) if existing
labor contracts prevent shifting of pension
funds to PRAs, (2) if the employer does not
have a pension plan for employees, and (3) if
the employer hires part-time or contingent
workers who are not eligible for company pen-
sions. Likewise, the self-employed would bear
the burden of the entire 3.0 percent contribu-
tion to PRAs. Of course, many will welcome
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the opportunity to shelter additional income
in tax-deferred accounts.
ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS. Over the
years, as the basic benefit grows more slowly
for upper- and middle-income retirees, PRA
balances would rise, permitting participants
to replace lost benefits. It is estimated that the
required annuity from PRAs combined with
the basic benefits from the reformed defined
benefit plan would provide all retirees who
worked long enough to receive the full basic
benefit (including minimum-wage workers)
with a combined retirement income well above
the poverty level, even assuming that the PRA
funds are invested conservatively. As shown
in Figure 26, even if all of the benefit cuts
identified by CED were implemented, the
combined system would provide replacement
rates at the normal retirement age that are
greater than or equal to the benefits promised
by the current insolvent system, which can-
not be paid in full with projected revenues.
Young workers would receive a higher return
on their total contributions under this dual
system than if the old regime were made
Replacement Ratios with CED Reform Proposal
(a) The ratio of future benefits to taxes could be significantly higher than indicated in the graph, because the CED proposal
incorporates a considerable margin for error. If current projections do not deteriorate significantly, it will not be necessary to fully
phase-in all the spending cuts proposed by CED. The CED PRA investment return assumes an average investment portfolio of
60 percent in fixed assets at a real rate of return of 2.3 percent, and 40 percent invested in private equities with a real return of
7.0 percent, for a combined real rate of return on the account of 4.175 percent.
(b) Male retiree with steady lifetime earnings.
SOURCE: Office of the Actuary, Social Security Administration with calculations by CED.
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(a) The ratio of future benefits to taxes could be significantly higher than indicated in the graph because the CED proposal
incorporates a considerable margin for error. If current projections do not deteriorate significantly, it will not be necessary to fully
phase-in all the spending cuts proposed by CED. The CED PRA investment return assumes an average investment portfolio of
60 percent in fixed assets at a real rate of return of 2.3 percent, and 40 percent invested in private equities with a real return of
7.0 percent real, for a combined real rate of return on the account of 4.175 percent.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Advisory Council on Social Security, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1997), Appendix II, p. 189.
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CED proposal: features a reduced benefit for existing program combined with a 3.0% contribution to
an individual account (1.5% employer and employee).
CED basic benefit: as described in text, solvent defined benefit component as proposed by CED.
PAYGO: achieves solvency by raising payroll taxes to keep pace with the future growth
in costs. Return is high initially because tax increases are delayed. (First tax rate increase begins in 2025.)
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solvent by increases in payroll taxes (Figure
27).
CED believes that the broader economic
consequences of this program would be highly
advantageous. For most workers, the contri-
butions to PRAs would provide a substantial
new source of retirement income and saving.
In 1995, for example, a contribution amount-
ing to 3 percent of covered payroll would have
amounted to $88 billion, about 1.5 percent of
personal income.27 Of course, as explained
earlier, not all of this contribution would rep-
resent new private saving. Moreover, because
individual contributions to PRAs receive a tax
preference and business contributions would
be a deductible cost, there would be some
reduction in federal tax revenues. But overall,
the program would generate a substantial in-
crease in national saving.
In sum, the reformed system recommended
by CED would achieve several desirable
objectives:
27. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, Survey of Current Business, (June 1996); and Social Security
Administration, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the
Federal OASDI Trust Funds, 1996, p. 176.
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• It would protect the basic economic secu-
rity of future retirees by ensuring the sol-
vency of the defined benefit system and
creating a new, privately owned source of
retirement income for all workers.
• It would raise national saving and thereby
provide for greater capital formation
needed to achieve higher long-term eco-
nomic growth.
• It would prevent the return on contribu-
tions from falling to unacceptable levels
and restore the faith of younger workers in
the system.
• It would help part-time, self-employed, and
contingent workers adjust to changing
labor market conditions by providing a new
source of retirement benefits for those with-
out employer-provided pensions.
The current Social Security system is
unsustainable. A timely combined effort is
needed on the part of the Administration and
Congress to address the unavoidable chal-
lenges that face Social Security and America’s
aging population. Delayed action will only
increase the magnitude of the problems fac-
ing Social Security. Changing the Social Secu-
rity system today, thereby allowing reforms
to be phased in gradually, is the only way to
avoid harmful tax levels, benefit cuts, or mas-
sive budget deficits in the future.
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Actuarial balance. The difference between the
summarized income rate and the summarized cost
rate over a given valuation period, often expressed
as a percentage of covered wages.
Actuarial deficit. A negative actuarial balance.
Actuarial equivalent. Benefit having the same
present value as the benefit it replaces. Also, the
amount of annuity that can be provided at the
same present-value cost as a specified annuity of
a different type or a specified annuity payable
beginning at a different age. For example, a lifetime
monthly benefit of $67.50 beginning at age 60 (on a
given set of actuarial assumptions) may be said to
be the actuarial equivalent of $100 per month
beginning at age 65.
Adjusted gross income (AGI). Amount of income
potentially subject to federal income taxation,
before consideration of exemptions and deductions.
Administrative expenses. Expenses incurred in
administering Social Security payments or asset
fund management. In the case of Social Security,
such administrative expenses are paid from the
OASI and DI trust funds.
Advisory Council on Social Security. Prior to the
enactment of the Social Security Independence and
Program Improvements Act of 1994 (Public Law
103-296), the Social Security Act required the
appointment of an Advisory Council every four
years to study and review the financial status of
the OASDI and Medicare programs. The most
recent Advisory Council was appointed on June 9,
1994, and published its final report in January 1997.
Under the provisions of Public Law 103-296, this is
the last Advisory Council to be appointed.
Annuity. An arrangement to provide an income
for a specified number of years, or for the remaining
lifetime of an individual, or the remaining lifetime
of more than one individual.
Assets, Social Security Trust Fund. Treasury notes
and bonds, other securities guaranteed by the
federal government, certain federally sponsored
agency obligations, and cash, held by the trust
funds for investment purposes.
Assumptions. Values relating to future trends in
certain key factors which affect the balance in the
trust funds. Demographic assumptions include
fertility, mortality, net immigration, marriage,
divorce, retirement patterns, disability incidence,
termination rates, and changes in the labor force.
Economic assumptions include unemployment,
average earnings, inflation, interest rates, and
productivity. Three sets of economic assumptions
are presented in the Social Security Annual Report
of the Board of Trustees representing high,
intermediate, and low costs. Alternative II is the
intermediate set of assumptions and represents
the SSA’s best estimates of likely future economic
and demographic conditions.
Automatic cost-of-living increase. The annual
increase in benefits, effective for December,
reflecting the increase in the cost of living. The
benefit increase equals the percentage increase in
the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners
and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) measured from the
average over July, August, and September of the
preceding year to the average for the same three
months in the current year.
Average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The
amount of earnings used in determining the
primary insurance amount (PIA) for most workers
who attain age 62, become disabled, or die after
1978. A worker’s actual past earnings are adjusted
by changes in the “average wage index” in order
to bring them up to their approximately equivalent
value at the time of retirement or other eligibility
for benefits.
Average wage index. The average amount of total
wages for each year after 1950, including wages in
noncovered employment and wages in covered
employment in excess of the OASDI contribution
and benefit base. These amounts are used to index
the earnings of most workers first becoming eligible
for benefits in 1979 or later and for automatic
adjustments in the contribution and benefit base,
bend points, earnings test exempt amounts, and
other wage-related amounts.
Glossary
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Baby boom. The period from the end of World
War II through the mid-1960s, usually identified
as 1946 to 1964, marked by unusually high birth
rates.
Bend points. The dollar amounts defining the
AIME or PIA brackets in the benefit formulas.
Beneficiary. A person who has been awarded
benefits on the basis of his or her own or another’s
earnings record.
COLA. See “Automatic cost-of-living increase.”
Constant dollars. One or more financial amounts
adjusted by the CPI to a constant year as a reference
point.
Contribution and benefit base. Annual dollar
amount above which earnings in employment
covered under the OASDI program are neither
taxable nor creditable for benefit computation
purposes. (Also referred to as “maximum
contribution and benefit base” or “maximum
taxable income.”)
Contributions. The payroll tax paid, based on a
percentage of earnings, up to an annual maximum.
Cost-of-living increase. See “Automatic cost-of-
living increase.”
Covered earnings. Earnings in employment
covered by the OASDI program.
Defined benefit plan. A pension plan providing a
defined benefit formula for calculating benefit
amounts, such as a flat amount per year of service,
a percentage of salary, or a percentage of salary
times years of service.
Defined contribution plan. A pension plan in
which the contributions are made to an individual
account for each employee. The retirement benefit
is dependent upon the account balance at
retirement. The balance depends upon amounts
contributed, investment experience, and in the case
of profit sharing plans, amounts that may be
allocated to the account because of forfeitures by
terminating employees.
Earnings test. The provision requiring the
withholding of benefits if beneficiaries under age
70 have earnings in excess of certain exempt
amounts.
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA).
Provision authorizing taxes on the wages of
employed persons to provide for Retirement,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance and for
Hospital Insurance. The tax is paid in equal
amounts by workers and their employers.
Index funds. Stock or bond portfolios structured
so their risk levels and expected returns closely
approximate those of stock or bond market indexes.
Individual retirement account (IRA). A retirement
account to which a worker can make annual tax-
deductible contributions for himself or herself up
to $2,000 or 100 percent of compensation, whichever
is less, and up to $2,000 for a nonworking spouse.
Intermediate assumptions. See “Assumptions.”
Long range. The next 75 years. Long-range actuarial
estimates are made by the SSA for this period
because it is approximately the maximum
remaining lifetime of current Social Security
participants.
Maximum family benefit. The maximum monthly
amount that can be paid on a worker’s earnings
record. Whenever the total of the individual
monthly benefits payable to all the beneficiaries
entitled on one earnings record exceeds the
maximum, each dependent’s or survivor’s benefit
is proportionately reduced to bring the total within
the maximum. Benefits payable to divorced spouses
or surviving divorced spouses are not reduced
under the family maximum provision.
Medicare. A nationwide, federally administered
health insurance program authorized in 1965 to
cover the cost of hospitalization, medical care, and
some related services for most people over age
65, and people receiving Social Security Disability
Insurance payments for two years. Medicare
consists of two separate but coordinated programs:
Part A (Hospital Insurance, or HI) and Part B
(Supplementary Medical Insurance, or SMI). All
persons entitled to HI are eligible to enroll in the
SMI program on a voluntary basis by paying a
monthly premium. Health insurance protection is
available to Medicare beneficiaries without regard
to income.
Normal retirement age. The age at which a person
may first become entitled to unreduced retirement
benefits. Currently age 65, but scheduled under
present law to increase gradually to 67 for persons
reaching that age in 2027 or later, beginning with
an increase to 65 years and 2 months for persons
reaching age 65 in 2003.
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust
Fund. See “Trust fund.”
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Pay-as-you-go financing. A financing plan under
which taxes are scheduled to produce just as much
income as required to pay current benefits, with
trust fund assets built up only to the extent needed
to prevent exhaustion of the fund by random
economic fluctuations.
Payroll taxes. A tax levied on the gross wages of
workers, up to maximum taxable income.
Portability. The right of an employee at termination
of employment to take vested benefits in cash and
transfer the funds to an individual retirement
account or another pension plan.
Present value. The equivalent value, at the present
time, of a future stream of payments (either income
or expenditures). The present value of a future
stream of payments may be thought of as the lump-
sum amount that, if invested today, together with
interest earnings would be just enough to meet
each of the payments as they fell due.
Primary insurance amount (PIA). The monthly
amount payable to a retired worker who begins to
receive benefits at normal retirement age or
(generally) to a disabled worker. This amount is
related to the worker’s average monthly wage or
average indexed monthly earnings.
Primary insurance amount formula. The
mathematical formula relating the PIA to the AIME
for workers who attain age 62, become disabled, or
die after 1978. The PIA is equal to the sum of 90
percent of AIME up to the first bend point, plus 32
percent of AIME above the first bend point up to
the second bend point, plus 15 percent of AIME in
excess of the second bend point.
Reallocation of tax rates. An increase in the tax
rate payable to either the OASI or DI Trust Fund,
with a corresponding reduction in the rate for the
other fund, so that the total OASDI tax rate is not
changed.
Retired-worker benefit. A monthly benefit payable
to a fully insured retired worker age 62 or older.
Retirement age. The age at which an individual
establishes entitlement to retirement benefits. See
also “Normal retirement age.”
Social Security Act. Provisions of the law
governing most operations of the Social Security
program. Original Social Security Act is Public
Law 74-271, enacted August 14, 1935. With
subsequent amendments, the Social Security Act
consists of 20 titles, of which 4 have been repealed.
The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
program is authorized by Title II of the Social
Security Act.
Special public-debt obligation. Securities of the
U.S. government issued exclusively to the OASI,
DI, HI, and SMI trust funds and other federal trust
funds. Section 201(d) of the Social Security Act
provides that the public-debt obligations issued
for purchase by the OASI and DI trust funds shall
have maturities fixed with due regard for the needs
of the funds. The usual practice in the past has
been to spread the holdings of special issues, as of
each June 30, so that the amounts maturing in each
of the next 15 years are approximately equal. Special
public-debt obligations are redeemable at par value
at any time and carry interest rates determined by
law.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). A federally
administered program (often with state
supplementation) of cash assistance for needy aged,
blind, or disabled persons. SSI is funded through
the general fund of the Treasury and administered
by the Social Security Administration.
Survivor benefit. Benefit payable to a survivor of
a deceased worker. For a spouse with no Social
Security benefits of his or her own, this payment
equals 100 percent of the worker’s PIA.
Taxable earnings. Wages and/or self-employment
income, in employment covered by the OASDI
and/or HI programs, that is under the applicable
annual maximum taxable limit. For 1994 and later,
no maximum taxable limit applies to the HI
program.
Taxation of benefits. From 1984 to 1993, up to
one-half of an individual’s or a couple’s OASDI
benefits was potentially subject to federal income
taxation under certain circumstances. The revenue
derived from this provision was allocated to the
OASI and DI trust funds on the basis of the income
taxes paid on the benefits from each fund.
Beginning in 1994, the maximum portion of OASDI
benefits potentially subject to taxation was
increased to 85 percent. The additional revenue
derived from taxation of benefits in excess of one-
half, up to 85 percent, is allocated to the HI trust
fund.
Trust fund. Separate accounts in the U.S. Treasury
in which are deposited the taxes received under
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the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Self-
Employment Contributions Act, contributions
resulting from coverage of state and local
government employees, any sums received under
the financial interchange with the railroad
retirement account, voluntary hospital and medical
insurance premiums, and transfers of federal
general revenues. Funds not withdrawn for current
monthly or service benefits, the financial
interchange, and administrative expenses are
invested in interest-bearing federal securities, as
required by law; the interest earned is also
deposited in the trust funds.
• Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). The
trust fund used for paying monthly benefits to
retired-worker (old-age) beneficiaries and their
spouses and children and to survivors of de-
ceased insured workers.
• Disability Insurance (DI). The trust fund used
for paying monthly benefits to disabled-worker
beneficiaries and their spouses and children
and for providing rehabilitation services to the
disabled.
• Hospital Insurance (HI). The trust fund used
for paying part of the costs of inpatient hospital
services and related care for aged and disabled
individuals who meet the eligibility require-
ments.
• Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI). The
trust fund used for paying part of the costs of
physicians’services, outpatient hospital services,
and other related medical and health services
for voluntarily enrolled aged and disabled
individuals.
Unfunded liabilities. Liabilities of the pension fund
for which there are not sufficient assets to pay.
SOURCES: Social Security Administration, Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996); and U.S. Department of
Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Trends in
Pensions 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1992).
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Memoranda of Comment, Reservation, or Dissent
Page 16, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
The report does a great service by clearly
explaining that the existing Social Security system
is financially unsound and needs fixing. The
system cannot pay promised benefits at current
levels of contribution. The system will give a very
poor return on the contributions of the young. The
system reduces national savings because it is un-
funded.
The report has two basic recommendations.
The first, with which I agree, mandates a new
forced retirement savings program (for 3 percent
of covered payroll). The contributions will go into
individual accounts and will not be available to
the government to spend or redistribute. The new
program should increase national savings. It will
not misrepresent the size of the real deficit. It will
give a fair market return on each dollar contribut-
ed. It will do all the things that the existing Social
Security retirement system fails to do.
The second recommendation, with which I do
not agree, recommends that we maintain the basic
outline of the existing Social Security retirement
system which absorbs 10+ percent of covered pay-
roll. The report recommends that certain Social
Security retirement benefits be reduced so that
benefits can be funded without increasing the cur-
rent level of contribution. The revisions recom-
mended would hopefully avoid insolvency of the
current system but would not fix any of its inher-
ent problems.
The report supports the continuation of a sys-
tem that incorporates a welfare program within a
savings program. The blend has confused policy
makers and misled the public. Sound policy re-
quires us to consider the welfare and savings pro-
grams separately. The Social Security retirement
plan recommended by the report will continue to
be an unfunded defined benefit retirement pro-
gram. Being unfunded it will add nothing to
national savings. Since it continues to promise
retirement benefits that will be paid for by some-
body other than the beneficiaries, it will continue
to reduce incentives for private savings. It will also
continue to give a terribly low return to young
people — especially those earning from $30,000 to
$65,000 per annum. The current system is a very
poor savings program. The reason for the low rate
of return is that the program redistributes the
contributions primarily of the young to provide
welfare benefits primarily to older people. Giving
older people extra money is a compassionate act,
especially if they are poor, but it is terribly unfair
to focus the burden of such gifts on young people
making less than $65,000 per annum. The current
system pays for its welfare program in a very un-
fair way. Everyone deserves a fair market return
on his Social Security retirement contribution. If
we choose to give some retirees more than a fair
market return on their contributions, we should
not pay for the transfer by giving the young
less than a market return. We should finance
redistributive welfare payments from general rev-
enues augmented, as needed, by a consumption
tax paid by everyone. We should not finance
those payments from a capped payroll tax paid
primarily by the young earning less than $65,000
per annum.
Allocating 3 percent for real savings and 10+
percent for unfunded redistributive welfare is not
a fair or productive way to handle payroll contri-
butions. We should move increasing amounts of
current Social Security retirement contributions into
the new forced savings program and we should
begin the move as soon as possible.
Page 17, LAWRENCE A. WEINBACH
This report includes a number of recommen-
dations designed to assure the long-range integri-
ty of the Social Security retirement income pro-
gram. One of those recommendations involves
raising the normal retirement age of the Old-Age
Survivors Insurance (OASI) program on a gradual
basis to 70 beginning in the year 2000. The report
also recommends that the normal retirement age
be indexed to changes in average life expectancy
after it reaches age 70 in the year 2030.
60
This report does not recommend an increase in
the early retirement age since it is assumed that
any early retirement benefit amounts will be fully
reduced actuarially to assure that the payment of
such benefits will be cost neutral to the OASI
program. While I believe that cost neutrality is
appropriate irrespective of the specified early re-
tirement age, I believe there are other important
reasons for increasing the current early retirement
age under the OASI program.
Increasing the early retirement age would serve
to assure that individuals are not provided with a
real economic incentive to retire at 62 since Con-
gress could be pressured to not fully actuarially
reduce early retirement benefits (e.g., adjust month-
ly benefit amounts for number of payment consid-
erations only). It also recognizes that, due to long-
er life spans, improved health conditions, changes
in the nature of the workforce and workplace, pro-
jected “skills gaps,” historically inadequate sav-
ings rates and other factors, most individuals can
and should be encouraged to work longer in the
21st century. Changing the early retirement age
would send a signal to individuals, employers and
unions to re-think their retirement plans based on
these recent and expected changes. In addition,
increasing the standard early retirement age
recognizes that a significant number of individu-
als place an undue amount of weight on when
they can first start receiving benefits in making
their retirement decision rather than the projected
adequacy of their benefits and other retirement
resources throughout their retirement years.
Given the above, I believe the early retirement
age under the OASI program should also be in-
creased to age 65 on a phased-in basis. The early
retirement age could also be indexed to changes in
average life expectancy in a manner similar to the
approach recommended for increasing the normal
retirement age.
While I believe that the early retirement age
should be raised, I also recognize that, due to the
nature of certain occupations, some individuals
will not be able to work longer. Therefore, I believe
that steps should be taken to allow certain individ-
uals who can provide evidence of their inability to
continue to work to be able to receive fully re-
duced early retirement benefits beginning at the
current eligibility age (i.e., 62).
Page 18, JOSH S. WESTON, with which PETER A.
BENOLIEL has asked to be associated
This report does not address the many com-
plex administrative issues involved in processing
funds for 140 million individual retirement
accounts, each of which permits employees to des-
ignate contributions to more than one fund. The
task would be massive not only because of the size
of the labor force but also because of the frequent
changes in employment status. Over one-third of
all workers — about 40 to 50 million individuals —
change their employer or employment status (e.g.,
employed to not employed) each year.
Adding to the administrative complexity would
be the need for a reliable, timely system for credit-
ing accrued interest and dividends to each em-
ployee’s several funds each month and executing
transfers between funds.
The report also does not address how fund
administrators would be chosen and their num-
ber. There is no likely way, in my view, that an
environment of multiple administrators, chosen
by either the fund managers, employers, or em-
ployees, could handle this very complex move-
ment of monies, investments, and employers. The
only credible solution would be a single private,
regulated administrator for all PRA accounts and
funds. The Federal Thrift Savings Plan is in many
ways a good model, although it is a public entity
and permits transfers among funds only once per
month. The two current public administration
systems that affect all employees are the Social
SecurityAdministration and the Internal Revenue
Service. Neither is sufficiently timely, nimble, and
accurate to serve as a national PRA administrator.
